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"We the People," Constitutional Accountability, and
Outsourcing Government
KlMBERLYN. BROWN"

The ubiquitous outsourcing offederal jUnctions to private contractors, although
benign in the main, raises the most fundamental of constitutional questions: What
institutions and actors comprise the "federal government" itse!p. From Abu
Ghraib to Blackwater, a string of scandals has heightened public awareness that
highly sensitive federal powers and responsibilities are routinely entrusted to
government contractors. At the same time, the American populace seems vaguely
aware that, when it comes to ensuring accountability for errors and abuses of
power, contractors occupy a special space. The fact is that myriad structural and
procedural means for holding traditionally government actors accountable do not
apply to private contractors exercising identical powers. This accountability
vacuum is not remedied by prevailing constitutional doctrine, which ignores the
realities of modern government by drawing an artifiCial line between the public
and private spheres. I have thus argued previously that all private contractors
should be viewed as anatomically related to other quasi-government entities such
as independent agencies, residing along a single continuum of constitutional
accountability. This Article builds on that premise by positing that private-public
relationships be structured to ensure accountability as a matter of constitutional
law.
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INTRODUCTION

It is easy to picture the following. Federal agency "A" contracts with private
corporation "B" for goods or services that the government would normally provide.
Corp. B's job is a mundane one. It provides linens to a veterans' hospital and does
so without incident. Few members of the public care enough to monitor Corp. B or
its relationship with the federal government. The scenario remains in obscurity. But
imagine instead a very different contract. Corp. B is given a substantial role in the
administration of a nuclear nonproliferation agreement with another country. 1 It
involves big dollars and the exercise of real discretion. Serious problems arise in
the execution of the contract. Press coverage is extensive. Politicians run for cover.
Corp. B becomes infamous, prompting resounding cries for reform--but of what
kind?
The latter narrative has become a staple of popular culture, and law scholars
have puzzled greatly over what to do about it. Private contractors engaged in
interrogations at Abu Ghraib prison that included sexual assault, beatings, and the
deprivation of food and water.2 Halliburton was hastily awarded multibillion dollar
contracts for nation building and military logistical support in Iraq, and wound up
facing numerous allegations of fraud, overcharging, kickbacks,3 and criminal
liability.4 Hired to provide security in Iraq and Afghanistan, Blackwater personnel
were charged with killing seventeen civilians in Baghdad. 5 Such high-profile cases
have prompted civil lawsuits, congressional investigations, and criminal liability.
Yet no systemic legal framework governs the federal government's decisions to
outsource in the first place. President Obama has sought to '''in-source' defenserelated jobs,,6 in reaction to former President Bush's massive outsourcing
initiative. 7 All this shows, however, is that the government's overall approach to
federal contracting remains ad hoc and politically vulnerable.

1. See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REv. 989, 1001
(2005) (discussing such a contract entailing an agreement with Russia under the Clinton
administration).
2. See AI Shimari v. CACI Int'!, Inc., 658 F.3d 413,415-16 (4th Cir. 2011); see also
Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation: Can the C.I.A. Legally Kill a Prisoner?, THE NEW
YORKER, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.newyorker.comJarchiveI2005/11114/051114fajact?
currentPage=all.
3. See Abigal H. Avery, Comment, Weapons of Mass Construction: The Potential
Liability of Halliburton Under the False Claims Act and the Implications to Defense
Contracting, 57 ALA. L. REv. 827, 837-38 (2006).
4. See Charles R. Babcock, Ex-KBR Worker Tied to Iraq Contract Fraud, WASH. POST
(Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.comJwp-dyniarticles/A45442-2005MarI7.htrnl.
5. See David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without
Cause, N.Y. TiMES (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.comJ2007/11/14/worldimiddleeasti
14blackwaterlhtrnl?pagewanted=all&_ r= 1&.
6. Matthew Potter, Small Businesses Are Starting to Organize Against Federal
"Insourcing" of Contractor Jobs, CBS NEWS (May 12, 2010, 5:45 AM), http://www.bnet.
comlbloglgovernmentlsrnall-businesses-are-starting-to-organize-against-federal-insourcingof-contractor-jobsl6471.
7. See Kevin P. Stiens & Susan L. Turley, Uncontracting: The Move Back to
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Many of the myriad structural and procedural means for holding government
actors accountable simply do not apply to private contractors exercising identical
powers. This accountability vacuum is not remedied by prevailing constitutional
doctrine, which ignores the realities of modem government by drawing an artificial
line between the public and private spheres. In short, no constitutional actor-not
the Supreme Court, Congress, or the President-is minding the constitutional store
to protect against the kinds of systematic abuses by private actors holding federal
8
power that the Constitution was structurally designed to avoid. When Congress
diverted prosecutorial powers to an independent branch of government, Justice
Scalia warned that "an issue ofthis sort will come ... clad, so to speak in sheep's
clothing," with the potential ''to effect important change in the equilibrium of
power [that] is not immediately evident.,,9 Privatization is similarly redefining
federal government as we know it without robust constitutional dialogue.
By contrast, the Constitution has featured heavily in the many legal debates over
whether independent agencies are structurally sound and, more generally, whether
redistribution of constitutional power in any form is proper. When Congress crafted
a new federal agency to regulate the accounting industry after the Enron debacle,
for example, its legislation faced sharp--and successful---constitutional attack lO for
failing to render the agency sufficiently accountable to the President. When the
Amtrak Corporation was created to further federal objectives, the Supreme Court
declared it a part of the government for purposes of the First Amendment,
notwithstanding legislative language to the contrary. 11 These kinds of precedents
should drive the discussion of how to manage and render accountable private
contractors, as well.
This Article urges recognition of a constitutional accountability doctrine that
would operate to tether the exercise of federal power to the people themselves. It
does so by deriving substance from the procedural framework of the Constitution.
Performing In-House, 65 A.F. L. REv. 145, 159-60 (2010) (discussing the Bush
Administration's goal of "competitive sourcing").
8. See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1507, 1510 (2001) ("[F]ederal constitutional law has little, if anything, to say about
a decision to contract with private entities for provision of public services, such as police and
fire protection, operation of jails and prisons, street cleaning, garbage collection, inspectional
services, and maintenance of public parks and buildings. There is no general federal antiprivatization doctrine requiring that particular government activities, state or federal, be
conducted only by traditional government employees.").
9. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988); see also Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 422 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting in dissent from decision upholding
United States Sentencing Commission that "I foresee all manner of 'expert' bodies, insulated
from the political process, to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking
responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.'s, with
perhaps a few Ph.D.'s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, 'no-win' political
issues as the withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of
fetal tissue for research. This is an undemocratic precedent that we set-not because of the
scope of the delegated power, but because its recipient is not one of the three Branches of
Government").
10. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010).
11. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374,400 (1995).
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Because the Constitution assumes that the ultimate source of all federal power is
the people, anyone who exercises the people's power must be structurally
accountable to the people. Acknowledging that the Constitution requires
accountability for the exercise of the power of the people is a first step towards
identifying constitutional boundaries around the practice of privatized government.
The Article then gives some definition to constitutional accountability and what it
might mean in practice.
Part I identifies the problem: an accountability imbalance between public actors
and private contractors exercising similar powers. To give a sense of the issue's
scope, this Part describes three examples of federal contracting-a McDonald's
restaurant at the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum, the outsourcing of special
military operations to the Blackwater Corporation, and the privatization of airport
security by the Transportation and Safety Administration (TSA}--and reviews the
barriers to holding contractors accountable that exist under current constitutional
and administrative law.
Deriving substance from the Constitution's procedural structure, Parts II and III
identify and apply the foundations and characteristics of a constitutional
accountability doctrine. Because the Constitution is a mere conduit for the people's
power, that power does not magically lose its constitutional character when it is
contractually delegated to private parties. Thus, the federal government cannot
outsource its powers without putting mechanisms in place for rendering contractors
accountable to the people and to the President. Part II outlines five particular
characteristics of constitutional accountability, and Part III revisits the scenarios
introduced in Part I as a platform for developing a preliminary doctrinal framework
for applying a constitutional accountability principle to outsourcing.
I. THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM OF PRIVATIZED GOVERNMENT

"Accountability" connotes a range of meanings. A common dictionary
definition associates accountability with being answerable, explainable, and
"subject to giving an account" or reckoning for one's actions. 12 Scholars have
similarly identified "the original or core sense of 'accountability'" as that which is
"associated with the process of being called 'to account' to some authority for
one's actions."J3 This mainstay conception of accountability has been refined to
encompass dual features:
[1]t is external, in that the account is given to some other person or
body outside the person or body being held accountable; [and] it
involves social interaction and exchange, in that one side, that calling
for the account, seeks answers and rectification while the other side,
that being held accountable, responds and accepts sanctions. 14

12. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 50 (1981).
13. See Richard Mulgan, "Accountability": An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 PUB.
ADMIN. 555 (2000).
14. Id. at 555 (emphasis in original). Professor Mulgan adds a third element-the right
to impose sanctions-but then notes that this "may appear to go beyond the notion of 'giving
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In the democratic context, a variant of core accountability takes shape. For
government actors, "the key accountability relationships ... are those between the
citizens and the holders of public office and, within the ranks of office holders,
between elected politicians and bureaucrats.,,15 As Part II explains, the fundamental
role of the people under the structural Constitution gives substantive meaning to the
idea of democratic accountability that distinguishes it from accountability in the
more generic sense.
Inevitably, democratic accountability is compromised with the practice of
government outsourcing, which occurs when the government contracts with private
parties to provide goods or services for which the government is responsible. 16 As a
result of hiring caps on federal employees, a desire for flexibility and short-term
"surge capacity," and a lack of in-house expertise,17 the practice has become
widespread within the federal government. From 2000-2013, the federal
government paid over $5.469 trillion to private contractors. IS Private contractors
now perform a broad range of functions for the federal government, including
formulating federal policy, interpreting laws, administering foreign aid, managing
nuclear weapons sites and intelligence operations, interrogating detainees,
controlling borders, designing surveillance systems, and providing military support
in combat zones. 19 Under these circumstances, contract terms-and not the
an account.'" Id. at 556.
15. Id. Richard Mulgan adds that public accountability further encompasses
the sense of individual responsibility and concern for the public interest
expected from public servants[,] ... the various institutional checks and
balances by which democracies seek to control the actions of
governments[,] ... the extent to which governments pursue the wishes or needs
of their citizens ... regardless of whether they are induced to do so through
processes of authoritative exchange and control[,] . . . [and] the public
discussion between citizens on which democracies depend.
Jd.
16. See Beermann, supra note 8, at 1525; Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability:
Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y Ill, 11317 (2005); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecutions?: The Limits of
Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 266. This Article does not
address other related forms of privatization, such as deregulation of personal relations
(including marriage), deregulation of markets, regulatory moves toward performance
standards and other cooperative strategies, vouchers, tax reductions, user fees, and the
creation of government corporations. See generally Beermann, supra note 8, at 1529-53.
17. ACQUISITION ADVISORY PANEL, REpORT OF THE ACQUISITION ADVISORY PANEL TO
THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 393
(2007) [hereinafter AAP REpORT]. The AAP Report was statutorily commissioned to
"review[] laws, regulations, and government-wide acquisition policies 'regarding the use of
commercial practices, performance-based contracting, the performance of acquisition
functions across agency lines of responsibility, and the use of Government-wide contracts.'"
Jd. at ix (quoting Pub. L. No. 108-136, 117 Stat. 1663 (2003)).
18. See Total Federal Spending, USA SPENDING, http://www.usaspending.gov/
trends?trendreport=default&viewreport=yes&maLcontracting_agency_ t=&pop_state_ t=&p
op_ cd_ t=&vendor_state_ t=&vendor_cd_ t=&psc_ cat_t=&tab=Graph+View&Go.x=Go
(reflecting data reported by agencies up until May 10,2013).
19. See Laura A. Dickinson, Governmentfor Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARy L. REv. 135, 138
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relational hierarchies that exist within a government bureaucracy and constitutional
democracy-govern contractor performance. To the extent that democratic
accountability is defined in part by the structures and procedures that are put in
place for federal actors, it suffers when private parties are routinely hired to do
things that federal actors would otherwise do. This is so even if accountability in
the basic sense of holding one to account to an authority is addressed by contractual
terms.
To put the problem in context, this Part describes three federal contracting
examples that characterize the range of public functions at stake in the outsourcing
context-from the mundane to the highly sensitive-with an eye toward revisiting
each after the foundations and characteristics of the constitutional accountability
requirement are established. It then walks through the existing legal means of
holding private contractors accountable for the misuse of federal powers and
observes, as others have, that federal employees exercising identical powers are
subject to more scrutiny and mechanisms for establishing democratic accountability
than are their private counterparts. Importantly, there is no constitutional doctrine
for identifying and enforcing boundaries on the outsourcing of federal powers in
the first place. Because the private delegation and state action doctrines have failed
to serve this important function, an alternative constitutional theory is needed.
A. Three Federal Contracting Variants

This subpart introduces three modem contracting scenarios-McDonald's at the
Air and Space Museum, Blackwater in the military theatre, and the outsourcing of
airport security responsibilities by TSA-as foils for exploring what public
accountability means, a concept that is constitutionally moored yet marginalized
under the modem regime of ad hoc and inconsistent federal contracting policy.
1. McDonald's at the Smithsonian
The federal government enters into thousands of contracts for routine goods and
services each year. 20 Over nine million people visit the Smithsonian's Air and
Space Museum annually, and many of them go to the McDonald's restaurant
(2005) (discussing the privatization of foreign affairs); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,551-52 (2000) (discussing the pervasiveness of
private actors in "regulation, service provision, policy design, and implementation");
William C. Nicholson, Seeking Consensus on Homeland Security Standards: Adopting the
National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, 12 WIDENER L.
REv. 491, 498-503 (2006) (describing the outsourcing of the "Response Plan" in greater
detail); Griff Witte & Charles R. Babcock, A Major Test for FEMA and Its Contracting
Crew, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at Al (reporting that the Department of Homeland
Security first outsourced to the Rand Corporation the creation of a national emergency
"Response Plan" before the work was eventually reassigned to the federal government).
20. See Selling to the Federal Government, PROCUREMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
CENTER,
http://www.sbtdc.orglprograms/ptaclselling-to-fed-govemment (describing the
thousands of government contracts that are available to businesses); see also U.S. SMALL Bus.
ADMIN., FEDERAL GoVERNMENT CONTRACTING 2, available at http://archive.sba.gov/idc!
U.S.
groups/publicldocuments/sba_homepagelserv--'pub_ contracting. pdf (describing the
government as the world's largest buyer of goods and services).
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there. 21 As a matter of public accountability, McDonald's agreement with the
Smithsonian can be grouped alongside commonplace contracts for "highway
maintenance, solid waste collection, and mail delivery.,,22 The public cares that the
goods and services delivered by McDonald's meet basic expectations-that the
food is of acceptable quality, that the facility is non-hazardous, and that the
employees who work there satisfy the basic requirements of their jobs. The public
no doubt also wants judicial recourse for torts and other private law violations
committed by McDonald's employees.
Individuals hardly fret, however, over whether federal employees would make
and serve hamburgers better or whether the Smithsonian is contractually or legally
empowered to hold McDonald's accountable for failing to meet expectations. 23
Although a handful of people might be interested in knowing whether the federal
procurement process that produced the McDonald's contract was sound,24 this
concern is probably more theoretical than real. Food service does not involve the
exercise of powers that conventionally belong to the federal government. The
McDonald's contract thus stakes out a pole on a constitutional accountability
spectrum for federal contracts. It reflects the many federal contracts for gardenvariety goods and services that do not warrant constitutional scrutiny because they
do not involve the outsourcing of "government" powers.

2. Blackwater
The infamous Blackwater Security Consulting firm, now Xe Services, is at the
opposite pole of a constitutional accountability spectrum for private contractors. Its
story entails the most nonroutine of government functions "that directly and
substantially affect health, liberty, safety, and personal autonomy,,,25 such as
contracts involving national security and military operations. When such highly

21. In 1846, Congress established the Smithsonian as a trust to be administered by a
board of regents and a Secretary of the Smithsonian. H.R. 5, 28th Congo (1846) (enacted); 20
U.S.C. § 76b (2006). It has a congressionally funded annual budget of nearly $800 million.
Smithsonian Fiscal Year 2011 Federal Budget Request Totals $797.6 Million, SMITHSONIAN
NEWSDESK (Feb. I, 2010), http://newsdesk.si.edulreleases/20 II-budget?
22. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Accountability Through Privatization, in PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 83, 106-07 (Michael W. Dowdle
ed., 2006) [hereinafter PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY]'
23. See Beermann, supra note 8, at 1522 ("In my view, contracting out of support goods
and services does not raise serious accountability issues since the source and quality of such
goods and services are not normally something the public cares much about."). Professor
Freeman notes, however, that "we might demand that contractors provide universal access,
comply with antidiscrimination norms, and put procedures in place to prevent arbitrariness in
termination decisions," particularly where vulnerable populations are affected (prisoners,
welfare and Medicaid recipients, school-age children). Freeman, supra note 22, at 106-07.
24. See Beermann, supra note 8, at 1522 (describing "contracting out" and the
possibility of corruption in the contracting process). Opposition to the contract might also
come from "government workers who either would lose their jobs [or] face transfer to
different units" once the decision was made to privatize food service at this federal
museum. [d. at 1523.
25. Freeman, supra note 22, at 106.
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sensitive government functions are outsourced to private parties by contract, a
constitutional boundary mandating at least minimal accountability becomes a
practical imperative.
In April of 2011, "there [we]re more contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan than
there [we]re uniformed soldiers.,,26 Contractors participate in a wide range of
activities for the military, from the provision of food services and mail delivery to
the running of active operations at the forefront of the battlefield. 27 Those engaged
in actual combat are known as military provider firms, which act like a "quasimilitary"-their personnel dress like military and are armed with sophisticated
weaponry.28 During the troop surge in 2007, private military contractors "in Iraq
outnumbered military personnel 180,000 to 165,000, with between 20,000 and
30,000 contractors in quasi-military roles.,,29
Private military contractors have been linked to numerous accounts of criminal
activity involving dead or injured civilians. 3o The company now known as Xewhich has existed as Blackwater in various corporate forms since 1997-has been
prominently implicated in a number of them. In 2010, the Obama administration
awarded Blackwater over a quarter of a billion dollars in contracts to work for the
State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan and
other global "hot zones.,,31 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reportedly explained
that, given the company's competitive bid and unparalleled experience, "there
really was not much choice.,,32 All totaled, Blackwater has received over a billion
dollars in federal contracts. 33 Its responsibilities have included tactics and weapons
training for military, government, and law enforcement agencies, including Navy
SEALS;34 high-risk security details for diplomats and other officials; and protection
of sensitive installations, including CIA offices abroad. 3s

26. Jeff Shear, A Professional Military and the Privatization of Warfare, PAC.
STANDARD (April 22, 2011), http://www.psmag.comlculture/a-professional-military-and-theprivatization-of-warfare-30468.
27. See Katherin J. Chapman, Note, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors'
Criminal Accountability Under the UCMJ, 63 V AND. L. REv. 1047, 1049 (2010).

28. See id.
29. Id. at IOS0 (citing Michael Hurst, After Blackwater: A Mission-Focused
Jurisdictional Regime for Private Military Contractors During Contingency Operations, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1308, 1310 (2008)).
30. See id. at 10SI.
31. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater's New Sugar Daddy: The Obama Administration,
NATION (June 28, 2010, 11: 19 AM), http://www.thenation.comlblog/367S6Iblackwatersnew-sugar-daddy-obama-administration.

32. Id.
33. Blackwater's Rich Contracts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3,2007), http://www.nytimes.coml
2007/J 0103/opinionl03iht-edblack.l. 7733227 .html.
34. See James Dao, Attack Turns Spotlight on Private Security Firms, REGISTER-GUARD,
Apr. 2, 2004, at A2; Blackwater Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.comltop/
newslbusinesslcompanieslblackwater_ usalindex.html.
3S. See Blackwater Worldwide, supra note 34; Mark Landler & Mark Mazzetti,
Still
Using Security Firm It Broke With, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.coml
2009108122/us/22intel.html?ref=blackwaterusa; Mark Mazzetti, Blackwater Loses a Job for the
c.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.coml2009/12/12/uslpoliticslI2black
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The company remains under investigation by multiple federal agencies and
Congress for a series of alleged wrongdoings, including "weapons charges, murder,
manslaughter, conspiracy, making false statements[,] using shell companies to win
contracts that may not have been awarded to Blackwater if the company's true
identity was clear," and "violat[ing] u.s. export control regulations in Sudan, Iraq
and elsewhere.,,36 In April of201O, five of the company's top officials-including a
former Blackwater president, two former vice presidents, and its former legal
counsel-were indicted on fifteen counts of conspiracy, weapons, and obstruction
of justice charges. 37 Federal prosecutors "are still pursuing the Blackwater
operatives alleged to be responsible for the single greatest massacre of Iraqi
civilians by a private U.S. force, the infamous Nisour Square massacre.,,38 In 2010,
Senator Carl Levin, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, formally called
upon the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Defense (DOD) to investigate what he
called '''the reckless use of weapons by Blackwater personnel and a failure by the
company to adequately supervise its personnel' in Afghanistan.,,39
Compounding this disquieting picture of Blackwater are the longstanding gaps
in federal oversight of military contractors in general. A congressional investigation
found in 2007 that, although Blackwater "charge[d] the government $1222 per day
for each private military operative-more than six times the wage of an equivalent
soldier," its high tab did not keep the company from overcharging. 40 An audit by
the State Department's inspector general in 2005 revealed, for example, that
Blackwater was billing "separately for 'drivers' and 'security specialists' who
were, in fact, the same people.,,41
In 2008, DOD's inspector general released a gloomy report on the challenges in
oversight of military contractors involved in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003 and
2007. 42 The report stated that contract requirements were not met, funds were either
inappropriately spent or missing, goods and services were either undelivered or
unaccounted for, individuals involved in the acquisition process lacked integrity,
and adequate documentation was not retained or prepared regarding the contracting
process. 43 Additionally, "[t]he sheer number of contracting actions and the
pressures on contracting officials to award procurements faster ma[ d]e the
challenge of correcting the problems more difficult.,,44 DOD had "limited visibility
over contractors and contractor activity, [a] lack of adequate contract oversight

water.html?ref=blackwaterusa.
36. Scahill, supra note 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id.
38. !d.
39. Id.
40. Blackwater's Rich Contracts, supra note 33.
41. Id.
42. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE DEP'T OF DEF., CHALLENGES IMPACTING
OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM AND ENDURING FREEDOM REpORTED BY MAJOR OVERSIGHT
BEGINNING FY 2003 THROUGH FY 2007
http://www.dodig.millAuditireports/fy08/08-086.pdf.
43. Id. at 2.
44. !d. at 1-2.

ORGANIZATIONS

(2008),

available at
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personnel, limited collection and sharing of institutional knowledge, and limited or
no information on contractor support in predeployment training.,,45
Fallout over the Blackwater scandals prompted The New York Times editorial
page to decry in 2007 ''the folly of using a private force to perform military
missions in a war zone" and the need for "[t]hese jobs ... to be brought back into
government hands as soon as practicable.'.46 Although Secretary Panetta suggested
that Blackwater has "shaped up [its] act," Rep. Jan Schakowsky, chair of the House
Intelligence Subcommittee that led classified investigations of Blackwater, called
the company's relationship with the federal security apparatus "just outrageous.'.47
She reportedly quipped, "What does Blackwater have to do to be determined an
illegitimate player? ... The CIA should not be doing business with this company
no matter how many name changes it undergoes. ,.48
As with McDonald's employees, the public has an interest in having Blackwater
personnel satisfy the requirements of the job-providing security details for
diplomats, protecting U.S. installations overseas in an effective and proper manner,
and providing federal troops the tactics and weapons training they need to execute
their missions, for example. Much of the public would understandably expect,
moreover, that violations of export regulations, criminal conspiracy, obstruction of
justice, murder, weapons abuses, and even torts are brought to light and dealt
with-just as men and women in uniform are rendered susceptible to penalties for
violations of law committed while in service.
The awarding of Blackwater contracts is also likely a matter of public
importance. 49 Not only do contracts involving national security and military
operations implicate the lives and liberty of civilians, they strike at the heart of
executive military power that the Constitution confers on the President in Article
11. 50 To the extent that Blackwater contractors exercise discretion that would
otherwise be lodged with federal actors, the public might be interested in knowing
that they use their discretion in a way that benefits the American public as a whole
and not just the company, and that they are meaningfully supervised by military
officials within the President's supervisory chain of command who can impose
consequences for wrongdoing. Accountability measures are not consistently
imposed on federal contractors, however. Blackwater exemplifies the need for a
less cavalier constitutional approach to outsourced government.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 6.
Blackwater's Rich Contracts, supra note 33.
Scahill, supra note 31.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. See generally Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing Debates,
in GoVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 1, 3 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, eds., 2009) (observing
that federal contracts have been made "literally off the books," "awarded under suspicious
circumstances, hurriedly and without competition," or under terms that "are so
underspecified as to afford contractors almost unlimited discretion").
50. See John D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and
Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001,1006-09 (2004).
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3. Privatizing TSA
The third contracting scenario appears less headline-grabbing than the "worstcase" example just described, yet it is potentially no less serious. Blackwater's
actions overseas affect most U.S. citizens only tangentially, ifat all. But travel from
domestic airports is an everyday occurrence. Housed within the Department of
Homeland Security, TSA is a relatively new federal agency that employs tens of
thousands of airport screeners, federal air marshals, and other employees. 51 Since
its inception, it has outsourced its core responsibilities to private contractors in
several airports.
In the immediate aftermath of the September II attacks, President George W.
Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),52 making the
federal government responsible for aviation and airport security. 53 Prior to ATSA,
passenger screening was the responsibility of airlines, with the actual duties of
operating the screening checkpoint contracted out to private firms. 54 Since 9111,
passenger screening and inspection of baggage have been further enhanced. 55 In
2011, former Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura sued TSA, alleging that airport
screeners' invasive pat-downs and body-imaging scans of his person constituted an
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 56 Ventura's suit
spoke for many U.S. citizens frustrated with post-9I11 enhanced airport security
practices. 57 It was notable, however, that Ventura was able to identify and sue TSA
as the federal entity accountable for alleged violations of his constitutional rights
that occurred during that screening.
Were Ventura to experience identical violations at the San Francisco airport
today, he would not have a constitutional claim. San Francisco is one of
sixteen U.S. airports for which the federal government has, since 2004,58

51. See September 11, 2011 and TSA, TRANsp. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/
about-tsalseptember-II-200 I-and-tsa.
52. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71,115 Stat. 597 (2001).
53. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: SCREENER TRAINING AND
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT STRENGTHENED, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS 7 (2005), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsld05457.pdf.

54. Id.

55. Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali, & Daniel H. Simon, The Impact of Post 9/11
Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel, CORNELL UNIV. DYSON SCH. OF
ECON., Feb. 2005, at 2.
56. Michael Sheridan, Jesse Ventura Files Lawsuit Against TSA, Homeland Security
Over Body Scanners, Pat-Down Searches, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Jan. 25, 2011, 1:54 PM),
http://artic1es.nydailynews.coml2011-01-25/newsl27096713 _1_body-scans-strip-search-law
suit. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction in November 2011. Ventura v. Napolitano, 828 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D.
Minn. 2011).
57. See, e.g., PLEASE REMOVE YOUR SHOES (Frederick C. Gevalt III, 2010), available at
http://pleaseremoveyourshoesmovie.com.
58. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS ON TSA's PROGRESS To ALLOW AiRPoRTS To USE PRIVATE PASSENGER AND
BAGGAGE SCREENING SERVICES (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assetsl250/244856.pdf.
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approved the wholesale replacement of TSA personnel by private contractors. 59
Airports can apply to TSA to opt out of the federal program and hire their own
screening company, and there is no apparent framework for oversight or review of
that decision-making process. 60 Yet contractors employ the same search techniques
as TSA employees, including x-ray scans and back-of-the-hand pat-downs of
individual passengers' private areas, in airports at which TSA has outsourced
•
61
securIty.
TSA's private contractor program has run into a number of problems. According
to the GAO, both government and private airport screening workers have failed to
find concealed bomb components during covert checkpoint testing,62 and a number
of reports of groping of passengers by private contractors have surfaced. 63 The
Office of Inspector General (OIG) in 2010 issued a report criticizing the TSA's
oversight of private contractors. 64 In fiscal year 2009, TSA had twenty-nine
contracts with private companies, worth $662 million. 65 OIG reviewed the thirteen

59. Derek Kravitz, As Outrage Over Screenings Rises, Sites Consider Replacing TSA,
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2010, at AI.
60. See Kravitz, supra note 59; Screening Partnership Program, TRANsp. SECURITY
ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/screening-partnership-program (last modified Dec.
19,2012); Frequently Asked Questions-Program, TRANsp. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.
tsa.gov/stakeholders/frequently-asked-questions-program (last modified Feb. 08, 2013).
Under ATSA, the head of TSA may approve an application to outsource screening to
"qualified" contractors if it certifies to Congress, first, that "the level of screening services
and protection provided at the airport will be equal to or greater than the level that would be
provided at the airport by Federal Government personnel" and, second, that the company is
owned and controlled by a U.S. citizen. 49 U.S.C. § 44920(a}-(d). Additionally, TSA must
provide supervisory personnel at airports, and they may fire contractors for "fail[ure]
repeatedly to comply with any standard, regulation, directive, order, law, or contract
applicable to the hiring or training of personnel to provide such services or to the provision
of screening at the airport," although airport operators have no liability for contractor errors.
Id. § 44920 (e}-(g). There are no implementing regulations to date.
61. See Frequently Asked Questions-Program, supra note 60 ("While the searches at
the airport will be conducted by private screening companies, such searches will continue to
be subject to the Fourth Amendment requirements of reasonableness because they are
conducted at the instigation of the federal Government and under the authority of federal
statutes and regulations governing air passenger screening."). Somewhat ironically,
Professor Verkuil observed in 2009 that the enhanced credibility of "wearing [a] badge" is
what "helped lead Congress to make airport security personnel public officials under the
Transportation Security Act" in the first place. Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to
Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 49, at 310, 327.
62. Mike M. Ahlers & Jeanne Meserve, TSA Shuts Door on Private Airport Screening
Program, CNN (Jan. 29, 2011, 2:07 AM), http://articles.cnn.comJ2011-01-29/traveUtsa.
private_1_tsa-government-screeners-screening-program?_ s=PM:TRAVEL.
63. Elizabeth Fuller, Air Travelers Tweet: TSA Pat-Downs and Scans Evoke Humor,
Tears, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.comlUSN
20 I 0/1123/Air-travelers-tweet-TSA-pat-downs-and-scans-evoke-humor-tears.
64. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S
ACQUISITION OF SUPPORT SERVICES CONTRACTS (2010) [hereinafter TSA's ACQUISITION OF
SUPPORT SERVICES CONTRACTS].
65. Id. at 2.
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most lucrative contracts, which represented 92 percent, or $609 million, of the total
amount contracted. 66 It found that TSA contractors performed "inherently
governmental functions" in contravention of the Office of Management and
Budget's (OMB) Circular A-76, which sets forth the President's policy for
outsourcing "commercial activities" to the private sector. 67 Although contract
administration is an inherently governmental function, three TSA contractors
performed that work under contracts worth $265 million. 68 In one instance, a
contractor performed the contract oversight and invoice review for its own
contract. 69 A $10 million contract for strategic planning was so vague that it
allowed the company to develop a system for passenger screening. 70
010 further found that TSA did not properly oversee the companies'
performances. For all thirteen contracts reviewed, government files were missing
vital paperwork, preventing TSA from monitoring whether the companies were
performing the contracted work. 71 The contractors submitted vague invoices and
were permitted to give their own progress reports, with no independent TSA
follow-up.72
TSA's heavy reliance on Lockheed Martin to perform its statutorily mandated
functions 73 has drawn particular scrutiny. In the spring of 20 11, hackers penetrated
Lockheed's computer system in an apparent effort to obtain "security information
that could be used to target defense secrets.,,74 Lockheed also entered into a $2
million settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) over charges that it
conspired to obtain sensitive, nonpublic information for the purpose of winning
additional government contracts. 75 Lockheed continues to perform work for TSA
pursuant to an eight-year, $1.2 billion contract awarded in 2008 to manage its
hiring and personnel program, with the option of expanding the contract to

66. Id.
67. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-76 REVISED, at attachment A & Part
B (2003); Verkuil, supra note 61, at 326. OMB's role in the process has led to tensions with
Congress over the effectiveness of private sourcing, the propriety of inherently governmental
classifications by agencies, and the lack of sufficient federal personnel to administer the
standards. PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 126 (2007). An agency's decision
regarding what is "inherently governmental" is effectively not reviewable. See id.; infra
notes 108-13 and accompanying text (discussing Circular A-76).
68. TSA's ACQUISITION OF SUPPORT SERVICES CONTRACTS, supra note 64, at 4.

69. See id.
70. Id. at 6.
71. See id. at 5.
72. See id. at 6-7.
73. See generally 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
74. Chloe Albanesius, RSA to Replace SecurID Tokens After Lockheed Cyber Attack,
PCMAG.COM (June 7, 2011, 10:47 AM), http://www.pcmag.comlarticle2/0.2817.2386512
,00.asp#fbid=V40ujCkxleY; see also Lockheed Martin Hit by Computer Breach, L.A.
TiMES, May 29, 2011, at A25; accord Mathew J. Schwartz, Lockheed Martin Suffers
Massive Cyberattack, INFO. WK. (May 31, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.informationweek.
comlnews/governmentlsecurity/229700 151.
75. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Lockheed Martin to Pay $2 Million to Resolve
Allegations Resulting from Fraudulent Submission of Government Contract, Jan. 24, 20 11,
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20IllJanuaryI11-civ-095.html.
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over $3 billion in work. 76 The contract gives Lockheed responsibility for
undefined tasks such as "workforce planning and program and project
management" as well as "recruitment and retention services" for TSA's 40,000+
employees. 77 In a letter to TSA's administrator, the Chair of the House
Homeland Security Committee criticized this contract for attempting to
'''outsource[]' away" TSA's personnel problems. 78
As with the Blackwater contracts, the public might be concerned that the
TSA procurement process is sufficiently competitive and fraud-free, and that
TSA does not overspend in comparison to what it would pay to hire federal
employees to perform the same job. TSA's contracts with private security
firms raise a heightened public interest in the proper execution of the
contracts, however, that differs from even the Blackwater example. As with
9111, a major screening error could lead to catastrophic consequences, including
losses of human life. Whereas Blackwater contractors' human rights abuses are
more likely to occur overseas, u.S. citizens fall vulnerable to groping and
other violations by TSA contractors operating domestically. TSA contractors
reportedly exercise an inappropriate level of discretion with insufficient
oversight, despite the post-9fll national security implications of airport
screening. 79 It is therefore also a matter of deep public concern that, despite
their private status, TSA contractors are exercising discretion with the
interests ofthe u.S. citizenry at heart rather than for pure corporate profit.
Moreover, as described below, the public's ability to influence policy-making
decisions involving personal privacy and transportation safety is arbitrary to the
extent that meaningful discretion is exercised at the airport level by an unprincipled
mix of public and private employees. These concerns are distinct from the
question of whether travelers can enforce in court the government's obligation
to respect individual constitutional rights,80 and thus warrant their own
constitutional framework for review and analysis.
B. Legislative, Regulatory, and Judicial Nonsolutions

As government outsourcing continues, the need to ensure proper oversight of
private contractors becomes all the more salient. 81 As with questions of the per se

76. See Elizabeth Newell Jochum, Lawmaker Raises Concerns Over Huge TSA
Personnel Contract, GoV'T EXECUTIVE (July 18, 2008), http://www.govexec.comldailyfed/
0708/071808e1.htm. For a summary ofTSA's top contractors and the dollar amounts of their
contracts, see Nick Wakeman, Transportation Security Administration Overview, WASH.
TECH. (Jan. 28, 2011), http://washingtontechnology.comlarticles/2011/01l31/upfront-tsaagency-snapshot.aspx.
77. Jocuhm, supra note 76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. See id.
79. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
80. See Beermann, supra note 8, at 1527-28.
81. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some
Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 22, at
115, 136 ("The problem [with privatization] as many see it is that state power has been
added without customary accountability arrangements for the use of that power."); Paul R.
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constitutionality of independent agencies,82 debate over whether the federal
government should outsource is a futile exercise. It is here to stay. The more
interesting and perhaps urgent task fixates on procedure: identifying how the
government should structure its contractual relationships with the private sector to
foster conformity with democratic and constitutional norms.
One such norm is political accountability. Yet, there is an accountability
disconnect when it comes to government-by-contract. Although one might debate
the effectiveness of the individual mechanisms that exist for holding public actors
accountable, as a whole the system captures numerous formal and informal checks
in a multilayered fashion. 83 Federal officers and employees are susceptible to
statutorily mandated transparency, regularity through bureaucratic processes,
electoral accountability at the highest, cabinet-level echelons,84 the judicial
enforcement of the rule of law,85 market competition and correction,86 and public
exposure through the press and the "court of public opinion.,,87 The majority of
these mechanisms do not apply to private contractors. 88
As the dominant mode of modem government, administrative bureaucracy
incorporates a particularly complex set of accountability modalities. 89 The
administrative state is a hierarchy, with the President at the top by constitutional
prerogative. 90 Decision makers are aware that they will be held accountable to a
Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV.
397, 400-01 (2006) (discussing the private contractor "accountability gap" and suggesting
that "inherent government functions" should be preserved for the public sector). As Paul
Verkuil explains, while outsourcing "involves the private sector potential\y supplanting both
public functions and public norms of administration[,] . . . unrestrained delegation of
government functions to private hands chal\enges the role of government and the rule of law
that sustains it." Verkuil, supra, at 419.
82. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687, 696 (1988) (discussing Supreme Court
precedent upholding the constitutionality of independent agencies); Richard H. Pildes,

Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and Financial Regulation: The Case of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 485, 489 (2009) ("[A]t least since Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the constitutionality
of independent agencies." (citation omitted».
83. See Mashaw, supra note 81, at 117-18.
84. But see John Braithwaite, Accountability and Responsibility Through Restorative
Justice, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 22, at 33, 33 ("[O]ur vote is mostly not the
accountability tool it once was."); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note
22, at 52, 70-71 ("The highly attenuated nature of electoral accountability means that it will
be of limited value for the purposes that proponents of accountability have recommended,
that is, arguing against open-ended delegations by the legislature, in favor of a unitary
executive, or in favor of federalism. ").
85. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, \03 COLUM. L. REv. 1367,
1401-02 (2003) (discussing the legal form of accountability through judicial review).
86. See Michael W. Dowdle, Public Accountability: Conceptual, Historical, and
Epistemic Mappings, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 22, at 1,3-5.
87. Jerry Brito & Drew Perraut, Transparency and Performance in Government, II
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 161,170 (2010).
88. See infra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
89. See Rubin, supra note 84, at 74-75.
90. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
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defined person or group with supervisory authority.91 Thus, "[a]n administrative
hierarchy is frequently a chain of accountability, and the idea of accountability
serves as an essential feature in the construction and operation of the hierarchy. ,,92
Elected leaders might respond to deeply felt views of the electorate, but they are
not obligated to justify their behavior in the same sense as someone who is
incentivized by the direct rewards or punishments of a supervisor within "a tightly
integrated hierarchy, such as those found within the administrative apparatus.,,93
Within the administrative hierarchy, moreover, a wide range of standards have
been imposed on federal agencies by Congress, the President, and the courts for
limiting the discretion exercised on behalf of the constitutional branches, and for
imposing transparency and modes of public participation. The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)94 is the primary statutory source for public disclosure, public
involvement in rule making, and judicial review of government decision making.
Its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provisions mandate public disclosure of
government activities. 95 The Federal Advisory Committee Act restricts and makes
public the advice that federal advisory committees provide agencies,96 and the
Government in the Sunshine Act makes statutorily defined agency meetings
public. 97 The Federal Register Act requires publication of regulatory documents for
public inspection 98 and the Information Quality Act (also known as the Data
Quality Act) directs OMB to issue government-wide "policy and procedural
guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity,
utility, and integrity of information ... disseminated by Federal agencies.,,99 This is
far from an exhaustive statutory list. Presidential oversight is brought formally into
the mix with Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, which require OMB oversight of
the regulatory process 100 through its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA).101 And "[s]ince 1970, the courts have expanded judicial supervision of
agencies by broadening the rules of standing, issuing more specific criteria

91. See Rubin, supra note 84, at 75.
92. Id. at 76.
93. Id. at 77. But cf Freeman, supra note 19, at 549 (arguing that there has been an
inordinate focus on formal accountability to the three branches of government while
aggregate accountability for private contractors-which would include contractual terms-is
a better model).
94. Administrative Procedure Act,S U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2006); see also Metzger, supra
note 85, at 1434 (noting that, whereas the AP A applies only to agencies, regulations
governing contractors focus on preventing fraud versus providing a way to challenge
contractors' actions).
95. Freedom ofInformation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
96. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5. U.S.C. app. § 2.
97. Government in the Sunshine Act,S U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).
98. Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-11 (2006).
99. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-154 (2001).
100. See Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order No.
12,498,50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 8,1985).
101. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-21; see also 2 JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL & BASIL
J. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.09 (2011) (describing the Paperwork Reduction Act,
which created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs).

2013]

"WE THE PEOPLE"

1363

regarding the development and use of a factual record, expanding notice and
comment requirements, and ... tak[ing] a 'hard look' at the reasonableness of
proposed regulations.,,102 Federal officers must take an oath to uphold the
Constitution, regardless of who happens to occupy the White House. 103
In contrast, administrative law places relatively lax legal constraints on private
contractors. I04 The AP A, the FOIA, and other disclosure statutes apply only to
agencies. lOS To be sure, OMB Circular A-76 forbids the outsourcing of "inherently
governmental" functions,106 but agencies overlook its provisions,107 which eschew
judicial review. 108 The Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998
codifies Circular A-76's definition of "inherently governmental function,,,I09 but it
has not been construed to enable judicial review of contracting decisions, either. 110
It requires, rather, that agencies publish lists of activities performed by government
employees that are not inherently governmental. III Although the FAIR Act
emphasizes competitive outsourcing, it does not provide for challenges to the
decision to outsource itself 112 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) I 13 is the

102. Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 136 (1985) (citations omitted).
103. See David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78
FORDHAM L. REv. 71, 84--86 (2009).
104. See David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, Outsourcing the Constitution
and Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REv. PUB. ADMIN. 103, 104--05 (2005).
105. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006).
106. See CIRCULAR No. A-76 REVISED, supra note 67, at attachment A, pt. B. Circular A76 predated the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act, which also provides a statutory
definition of "inherently governmental function." 31 U.S.C. § 501(5)(2)(A) (2006) ("The
term 'inherently governmental function' means a function that is so intimately related to the
public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees."). The statute
then lists examples ofthe types of "functions included." 31 U.S.C. § 50 I (5)(2)(B)(i)-{v).
107. See Freeman & Minow, supra note 49, at 3; see also Correction of Long-Standing
Errors in Agencies' Unsustainable Procurements Act of 2009, S. 924, Ilith Congo § 3
(2009) (finding that inherently governmental functions "have been wrongly outsourced");
Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2010, S. Con. Res. 13-42, III th Congo
§ 502(5) (2009) (requiring DOD to "review the role that contractors play in its operations,
including the degree to which contractors are performing inherently governmental
functions" (emphasis added)).
108. CIRCULAR No. A-76 REVISED, supra note 67, at 5(g) ("Noncompliance ... shall not
be interpreted to create a substantive or procedural basis to challenge agency action or
inaction."); see also Courtney v. Smith, 297 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
Circular A-76 does not provide standing because it is not a law and thus "the internal
administrative appeals process ... is intended to be the sole basis for challenging agency
action that allegedly violates the Circular"); VERKUIL, supra note 67, at 128 ("The agency's
designation of what is 'inherently government' is not subject to administrative review.").
109. 31 U.S.C. § 501(5)(2)(A).
110. Verkuil, supra note 81, at 452.
Ill. See 31 U.S.C. § 501(2).
112. See 31 U.S.C. § 501(2)(d).
lB. The FAR is codified in Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations and is
promulgated by the General Services Administration (GSA), DOD, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under the authority of the Office of Federal
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principal set of regulations governing the process through which the government
purchases goods and services, but only disappointed bidders have succeeded in
challenging contract awards for noncompliance. 114 Private tort and contract law
might apply, but lawsuits are often stymied by successful contractor immunity
defenses. lls Although the government retains contractual power to sue private
contractors under the Contract Disputes Act,1I6 it may contract out of certain
protections in the negotiating process 117 or lack the resources and motivation to
pursue common law remedies. liS The False Claims Act l19 allows for qui tam suits
to recover penalties from private contractors for fraud, but its requirements are
difficult to satisfy. 120
Consequently, Jerry Mashaw has suggested that a "retreat from accountability"
results when public functions are outsourced at the expense of transparency:
"Private actors are presumptively entitled to privacy; public officials are not.
Private actors generate 'proprietary' information; the information produced by
public agencies is 'owned' by the public. Public actors must often give public
reasons for their actions; private preference motivates markets.,,121 Whereas
bureaucratic accountability engages vertical hierarchies (much like a principalagent relationship), contractual arrangements are horizontal. 122 If a contractor is in
breach, the government stands as a party to the contract with common law remedies
rather than as a superior with review and removal powers within an administrative
structure. And although contract terms and private law contain a variety of
standards for contractor behavior, such standards are not constitutionally moored,

Procurement Policy Act of 1974. See 41 u.s.c. §§ 401-38 (2006).
114. Bidders can either challenge the agency's failure to comply with Circular A-76
under the APA or file bid protests with the GAO under 31 U.S.C. § 3551. Robert H. Shriver
III, No Seat at the Table: Flawed Contracting Out Process Unfairly Limits Front-Line
Federal Employee Participation, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 613, 627 (2001) (citing CC Distribs. v.
United States, 883 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding no constitutional standing to sue»; see
also Verkuil, supra note 81, at 453 ("This leaves contractors themselves the most likely
candidates to achieve judicial review and makes such review dependent upon the
government denying rather than granting a request to privatize a government function."); cf
id. at 454 (suggesting that the Subdelegation Act might provide an avenue for judicial review
of delegations to private parties) (citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 301-02 (2000».
115. See, e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying immunity
to private foster care contractor in action under federal disability laws); Pani v. Empire Blue
Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying immunity to private insurance
company in Medicare dispute); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only
Problem, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1216, 1228 (2008) (reviewing VERKUIL, supra note 67)
(arguing that private contractors should not be immunized for government work performed).
116. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-09 (2006).
117. See Freeman, supra note 19, at 591.
118. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 97-98 (explaining how both the executive and
legislative branches may lack the motivation to hold private actors accountable).
119. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006).
120. See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GoVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT, supra note 49, at 335, 356.
121. Mashaw, supra note 81, at 136.
122. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 109-10.
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thus placing private contractors in a less accountable posture than their public
counterparts who might exercise identical authority. 123
C. Two Failed Constitutional Doctrines

Although the Constitution sets forth standards that dictate how the implements
of government are established l24 and the respective roles of the tripartite
branches,125 its text does not provide a "standard set of institutional designs that we
recognize as responsive to the[] . . . accountability concerns" that characterize
outsourcing today.126 Of course, the founders could not have anticipated the
complex administrative behemoth that currently sprawls across Washington, D.C.,
or the extent to which corporate America influences government both politically
and vicariously through the execution of government contracts. Scholars have
attempted to retool existing constitutional doctrine to capture excesses in
outsourcing, but these efforts have not borne fruit doctrinally. There is in all
likelihood a practical reason for this: both the federal contracting apparatus and the
administrative state are buttressed by current understandings of the nondelegation
and state action doctrines. If the Supreme Court were to tinker with existing law to
limit government outsourcing, it could jeopardize key supports for the
administrative bureaucracy itself.
1. Private Delegation
Although tailor-made for confining the outsourcing of federal powers to private
parties, the private delegation doctrine does not fulfill its constitutional potential. 127
To be sure, it serves up a promising argument against excessive privatization: that
the powers vested by the Constitution in the respective branches must be exercised

123. Public actors are also bound to respect individuals' constitutional rights to the extent
that their actions intersect with them. Thus, a social security recipient has a right to due
process in the processing of her claims. Under the state action doctrine, a contractor charged
with processing benefits would be liable for due process violations only if it qualified as a
state actor. See infra Part I.C. This Article does not argue for the complete
constitutionalization of federal contractors, however. It suggests that the structure of
outsourced relationships could be designed to conform to constitutional norms without
rendering private contractors constitutionally liable in private litigation.
124. See, e.g., U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (appointment clause); id. art. I, §§ 1,7, cl. 2
(bicameralism and presentment requirements); id. art. III, § 1 (clause establishing the
Supreme Court).
125. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (executive vesting clause); id. art. II, § 3 (take care
clause); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (necessary and proper clause); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (case or
controversy clause).
126. Mashaw, supra note 81, at 139; see also Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations,
Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in GOVERNMENT By CONTRACT, supra note 49, at
291,291 ("[Clonstitutionallaw has had little to say about privatization, even as privatization
is fundamentally reshaping government. ").
127. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 88 (arguing that despite the nondelegation doctrine,
Congress has the power to delegate "broad powers that afford private actors considerable
discretion").
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in the precise way they are constitutionally authorized and cannot be transferred
elsewhere. 128 Such a claim featured prominently in post-New Deal litigation around
the propriety of the burgeoning administrative state. 129 In Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan,130 the Court struck down a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) 13 I that empowered the President to manage a statutory prohibition on
interstate shipment of petroleum on the grounds that Congress had set "no criterion
to govern the President's course.,,132
A challenge to private delegations reached the Supreme Court around the same
time, with similar results. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,133 the Court
famously held unconstitutional a statute that authorized the promulgation of
regulations to govern the sale of chickens. NIRA empowered private trade and
industrial groups to draft codes of fair competition, which were subject to the
President's approval. 134 The Court declared the legislation a violation of the
separation of powers, since it enabled businesses "[to] roam at will and the
President [to] approve or disapprove their proposal as he may see fit.,,\35 Congress,
the Court explained, "is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.,,136 With rhetorical
flourish, the Court went on to suggest that an alternative ruling-enabling
delegations of legislative power to private parties-would border on the
unthinkable:
[W]ould it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to
empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent
for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? ... The
answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown
to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional
prerogatives and duties of Congress. 137
The Supreme Court long ago declined to extend the holdings in Panama
Refining and Schechter Poultry to further confine congressional delegations of
legislative power, concluding that Congress has broad authority to delegate so long
as its enabling legislation includes an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise

128. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) ("The nondelegation
doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system
of Government. . . . Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another
Branch.").
129. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Metzger, supra note 85, at 1437-45
(discussing nondelegation cases in the Supreme Court following the New Deal).
130. Panama Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 388.
13!. 15 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
132. Panama Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 415.
133. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 495.
134. See id. at 521-53 & 521 n.4.
135. Id. at 538.
136. Id. at 529.
137. Id. at 537.
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of discretion. 138 In Mistretta v. United States,139 the Court explained that this
principle "has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives.,,14o "Intelligible principle" has since devolved into a toothless
term, with the Court sustaining vague legislative instructions to act, for example,
"in the 'public interest. ",141
A modem doctrinal version of nondelegation would be a tricky fix for
privatization run amok. The argument hinges on a diligent reading of the vesting
clauses-that the legislative branch and only the legislative branch can exercise
legislative power, for example-and not on the public versus private status of the
delegatee. Thus, a ban on private delegations would be difficult to fashion without
calling into question the propriety of legislative delegations to administrative
agencies as well. And to the extent the Justices adhere to Mistretta's pragmatic
approach to doctrine, they are unlikely to wade into such perilous waters. The
private delegation doctrine is thus poorly suited for the work of setting
constitutional limits on outsourcing. 142
2. State Action
In theory, the state action doctrine provides an alternative mechanism for
holding private actors constitutionally accountable for malfeasance by virtue of the
government's control or coercion over them. In effect, it converts private actors
into state ones for purposes of liability for violations of individual plaintiffs'

138. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928»; Freeman, supra note 22, at 88.
139. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
140. Id. at 372.
141. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing Nat'l Broad.
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225--26 (1943); New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United
States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932» ("[W]e have found an 'intelligible principle' in various
statutes authorizing regulation in the 'public interest. "').
142. Justice Scalia suggested in Mistretta that "the doctrine of unconstitutional
delegation" of legislative and policy-making power is so "essential to democratic
government" that "[o]ur [m]embers of Congress could not, even if they wished, vote all
power to the President and adjourn sine die." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, 1.,
dissenting) (emphasis omitted). Nor, he added, could some lawmakers hand off their
constitutional duties, such as voting on bills. See id. at 425. "By a parity of reasoning," Paul
Verkuil has argued, "the President cannot tum the executive power over to the Vice
President and retire in office." Verkuil, supra note 81, at 425. Professor Verkuil thus
suggests that the powers exercised by principal officers who were confirmed by the Senate
and have taken oaths to uphold the Constitution are similarly nondelegable. See id. The
President can delegate to subordinates under the Subdelegation Act, Verkuil adds, with
limits; he can only delegate to Officers of the United States. Id. at 426 (citing 3 U.S.C. §§
301-{)2 (2006». By the same token, the statute limits the President's ability to delegate to
lesser officials or outside parties. See id. at 427. The Subdelegation Act notwithstanding,
Professor Verkuil argues that "[t]he President could never claim an inherent power to
delegate official duties to private hands." Id. at 427--28.
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constitutional rights. 143 In Blum v. Yaretsky,l44 the Supreme Court described the
doctrine as enabling states to be held "responsible for a private decision only when
it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement,
either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State.,,145 As a means for triggering accountability, however, the test's requirement
of coercive state power over the private actor has it exactly backwards: It relieves
from constitutional scrutiny altogether those contractors who exercise the most
discretion pursuant to the least amount of government involvement or oversight. 146
Thus, the powerful contractor who exercises extensive discretion without
government intervention evades the test for state action; this is precisely the profile
that raises the greatest potential for unmitigated abuse.
Moreover, courts rarely sustain state action challenges. 147 The Supreme Court
has preserved "private" status where the commingling of government and private
functions is significant. In Blum, for example, the Court found that privately owned
nursing homes were not state actors susceptible to due process challenge by
disgruntled residents, even though the state "subsidized the operating and capital
costs of the nursing homes, and paid the medical expenses of more than 90% of the
patients.,,148 In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn/ 49 the Court insulated a privately owned
school from constitutional scrutiny over employee discharges. 15o In doing so, the
Court suggested that the school's posture vis-a-vis the government was comparable
to that of private contractors:
The school, like the nursing homes, is not fundamentally different
from many private corporations whose business depends primarily on
contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the

143. See Verkuil, supra note 81, at 431 (observing that the state action doctrine
'''constitutionalizes' after-the-fact delegations that amount to the exercise of public
authority" rather than limit them in the first instance).
144. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
145. Id. at 1004 (citations omitted). Gillian Metzger summarizes the state action doctrine
as having two prongs:
[F]irst, whether "the [challenged] deprivation ... [was] caused by the exercise
of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible"; and second,
whether "the party charged with the deprivation ... [is] a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor."
Metzger, supra note 85, at 1412 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982) (omissions and alterations in original)). Professor Metzger notes that, because the
first prong is easily satisfied, the key step is the second, which is "often alternatively
characterized as determining whether 'there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action. '" Id. at 1412 & n.149 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999)).
146. See Metzger, supra note 85, at 1425.
147. See id. at 1419-21 & n.185.
148. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982) (discussing Blum, 457 U.S. at
1005).
149. Id. at 830.
150. Id.
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government. Acts of such private contractors do not become acts of the
government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in
performing public contracts. 151
The state action doctrine's fonnalist approach to the line between public and
private leaves bare an ineluctable question: Are there any constitutional limits on
the exercise of governmental power per se, regardless of the actor? Whereas the
private delegation doctrine has been construed to allow virtually limitless
legislative delegations, the state action doctrine omits analysis altogether of the
nature of the power being exercised by a government contractor. 152 As a
consequence, prevailing constitutional doctrine places no boundaries on the federal
government's ability to transfer what might be considered core government
functions to private parties in the first place.
What results is an unsettling anomaly: "a government entity may do only what
the law pennits and prescribes; a private entity may do whatever the law does not
forbid.,,153 Although the Constitution enumerates the functions of the federal
government, it does not indicate whether they must be carried out by federal
employees. 154 Government agencies operate under complex accountability
bureaucracies, with the Constitution at their apex. It is largely taken for granted that
public values such as fair process and public participation will accompany the
exercise of governmental power. With private contractors, however, federal
hierarchies that exist in part to preserve those values are replaced by contractual
tenns. 155 No existing constitutional doctrine injects into the private exercise of
governmental power the important nonns that animate the public exercise of such
power.

II. ACCOUNTABILITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
This Part asserts that the Constitution is nonetheless fundamentally concerned
with the oversight lapses outlined in Part I. It posits that public accountability for
those who exercise the power of the people is, in fact, inherent in the document's
design. Properly applied, such a principle gives rise to otherwise elusive constraints
on the manner in which public functions are outsourced to private parties. This Part
identifies two strains of constitutional accountability-accountability to the people
and accountability to the President-and then gives doctrinal shape to each by

151. Id. at 840-41 (emphasis added).
152. Metzger, supra note 85, at 1370, ("Current doctrine pays little attention to whether
the government is, in fact, delegating power to private entities to act on its behalf.").
153. KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., PRIVATIZATION AND THE FEDERAL
GoVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 20 (2006) (citing Ronald C. Moe, The Importance of
Public Law: New and Old Paradigms of Government Management, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 41, 41-57 (phillip J. Cooper & Chester A. Newland eds., 1997)).
154. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE 130 (2004) ("The
Constitution does not tell us which of the millions of federal employees rise to the level of
'Officers of the United States' whose appointments much conform to [the Appointments
Clause].").
155. Id. at 21-22.
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deciphering the Supreme Court's consideration of such issues in a range of
constitutional decisions.

A. Accountability to the People
The smattering of available tools for surveillance of privatized activIties is
systematically inadequate, particularly as compared to the constitutional and
statutory oversight mechanisms that bind government actors performing identical
functions. This imbalance is problematic not just for practical reasons but also as a
matter of constitutional theory. Although the means of implementation have varied,
history reveals public accountability as a fundamental principle underlying the
Constitution's structure. IS6 It is a necessary corollary to the American constitutional
premise that all governmental power flows from the people.
1. Foundations of Accountability to the People
The mainstream assumption that outsourcing is fundamentally a matter of
contract law and political will overlooks a contradiction posed by one of the
Constitution's foundational premises. Under the Constitution, the people are the
sole source of governing power. IS7 Every exercise of that power flows throughnot from-the Constitution. Accordingly, every person exercising that power
remains ultimately and exclusively accountable to the people. Taken together, these
bedrock procedural ideas support the intuitive conclusion that private contractors
exercising federal power in the peoples' name must-like their government
counterparts-be structurally accountable. IS8
a. "We the People"
The founders believed that all governmental power should flow from the
people. IS9 Having fled a tyrannical monarchy, they understandably wanted a

156. In his recent book, America's Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and
Principles We Live By, Akhil Reed Amar elegantly argues that "no clause of the Constitution
exists in textual isolation. We must read the document as a whole. Doing so will enable us to
detect larger structures of meaning-rules and principles residing between the lines." AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRIITEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE
LNEBy 6 (2012).
157. See Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and
Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1563, 1586 (1997) (citing GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REpUBLIC 1776-1787, at 550 (1969» ("Because the
Federalists regarded the people as 'the only legitimate fountain of power,' no department
was theoretically more popular and hence more authoritative than any other."). Furthermore,
"by placing sovereignty in the people, both liberal theory and the Constitution make the
political sovereign the source of delegated, not inherent, powers." Verkuil, supra note 81, at
4007.
158. See Dowdle, supra note 86, at 3 ("At its heart, the idea of public accountability
seems to express a belief that persons with public responsibilities should be answerable to
'the people' for the performance of their duties.").
159. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl.; THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (Alexander Hamilton).
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government that not only granted its people more freedoms but also responded to
them. The Declaration of Independence thus provides that "to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed," and adds that "whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish
it.,,160 In Federalist No. 49, Alexander Hamilton reiterated that the people should be
consulted whenever the structure of government is altered "[a]s the people are the
only legitimate fountain ofpower.,,161 He similarly emphasized in Federalist No. 78
that "[n]o legislative act, ... contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this
would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is
above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people
themselves.,,162
Ultimately, the founders did not create a true democracy, which Madison
defined as government in which a small group of people assemble and participate
personally.163 The first state constitutions did establish strong legislatures that were
structured to closely represent the people, primarily by concentrating power in the
lower assembly.l64 Most early state legislatures passed laws, appointed judges and
governors, and amended their constitutions by statute without the threat of
165
executive branch veto. Constituents were empowered to literally '''instruct' their
representatives.,,166 But this pure form of democracy was rejected by the founders
of the Federal Constitution. Madison deemed such democracies "spectacles of
turbulence and contention; ... incompatible with personal security, or the rights of
property; and ... as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their
deaths.,,167 Early state legislatures were perceived to have been captured by "selfish
factions and demagogic leaders" who "enacted ill-advised laws infringing rights of
contract, property, and trial by jury" at the expense of the public goOd. 168
The founders instead opted for a republic, whereby power is run through a small
number of wiser government representatives. 169 When a republic extends to cover
an extremely large population, opinions are more diverse, making it more difficult
for a majority faction to take hold. 170 In making this choice, the founders retained
the guiding mantra that the ultimate source of the power remains with the people. It

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
See Dowdle, supra note 86, at 4.
Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1581-82.
Id. at 1582.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583; see also Dowdle, supra note 86, at 3-4 (noting

early critiques of "patronage-based politics").
169. The Founders offered vague definitions of the term at times. Alexander Hamilton
defined a republic as a government that "requires that the sense of the majority should
prevail," THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009), and
James Madison defined it as "a government in which the scheme of representation takes
place." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
170. THE FEDERALIST No.1 0 (James Madison).
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is the Constitution's opening salvo: "WE THE PEOPLE of the United States ... do
. ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.,,171 Madison
explained in Federalist No. 37 that "[t]he genius of republican liberty, seems to
demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people; but
that those intrusted [sic] with it should be kept in dependence on the people.,,172
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reinforced the notion that government exercises
only delegated powers that are channeled from the people through the
Constitution. 173 Several Justices once declared that "[t]o hold otherwise is to
overthrow the basis of our constitutionallaw.,,174 In its relatively recent invalidation
of a statutory provision embedding an independent agency within an independent
agency, the Court expressed concern that the expanding government might be
"slip [ping] from the Executive's control, and thus from that of the people.,,175

171. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 356 (2004) (Breyer, 1.,
dissenting) (observing that the Preamble's "We the People" language reflects a "fundamental
principle" of American government that anchors a constitutional design that is "basically
democratic"); United States v. Int'l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, 1., dissenting) ("Under our Constitution it is
We The People who are sovereign. The people have the final say. The legislators are their
spokesmen. ").
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison).
173. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) ("[T]he Framers,
in perhaps their most important contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly
responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the people, and chosen directly, not
by States, but by the people."); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 22fr27 (1920) (noting that
"[t]he Constitution of the United States was ordained by the people," who "grant" authority
to Congress, and "[i]t is not the function of courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to
alter the method which the Constitution has fixed"); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 359
(1901) (Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, & Peckham, J1., dissenting) ("[N]o utterance of this court
has intimated a doubt that in its operation on the people, by whom and for whom it was
established, the national government is a government of enumerated powers, the exercise of
which is restricted to the use of means appropriate and plainly adapted to constitutional ends,
and which are 'not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. ''');
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819) ("The government proceeds
directly from the people; is 'ordained and established' in the name of the people ...."); see
also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("When any Branch acts, it is presumptively
exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it. "); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (observing that the Equal Protection Clause "is an essential part of
the concept ofa government of laws and not men" and "is at the heart of Lincoln's vision of
'government of the people, by the people, [and] for the people'" (alteration in original)
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,568 (1964))); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[T]he Federal Government[,]
as a whole, possesses only delegated powers. The purpose of the Constitution was not only
to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand.").
174. Downes, 182 U.S. at 359.
175. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156
(2010).
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b. Derivative Power
The founders' idea that the power flows from the people is necessarily linked to
the understanding that those who exercise power in the people's name must be
accountable to them. 176 The Constitution's very structure reflects a number of
safeguards that foster accountability.177 First, the framers established the federal
government as one of limited and enumerated powers. 178 Before the government
can act, it must be able to trace derivative authority for its actions directly back to
the Constitution, which was "ordain [ed] and establish[ed]" by the people. 179 The
Constitution grants the government specific powers, lays out its structure, and
explains how the government will make decisions and function. ISO
James Madison accordingly described the interplay between state and federal
governments as a "compound republic" that provided "double security.,,181 State
governments were intended as separate laboratories that could be used to
experiment with different forms of government, but the founders did not grant
states carte blanche. The Constitution's Guarantee Clause requires the federal
government to ensure that states employ republican forms of government,182 and
empowers the people of each state to create a government independent of other
state governments and the federal government itself. 183
Second, the founders created a government of separated powers, an idea derived
from Montesquieu. l84 Rather than mixing government by social class, it would be

176. As Harold Bruffhas observed, "The Federalist Papers are replete with emphasis on
the need to ensure public knowledge of accountability for particular actions." Harold H.
Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 491,
507-08 (1987) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed.,
1961».
177. See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491, 1518
(2002) (citing U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring concurrence of two differently
constituted legislative houses to pass legislation); U.S. CaNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (ensuring
that states do not discriminate against citizens of other states); U.S. CaNST. amends. I-VIII
(limiting power of Congress to legislate in areas affecting certain individual rights».
178. See Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
179. U.S. CaNST. pmbl.; see also Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action
Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REv. 1767, 1793 (2010)("The structural provisions of the
Constitution embody the delegation of power from the people to their rulers and provide
convincing evidence that the power to govern flows from the people-who, as principals,
'ordain[ed] and establish[ed], the Constitution-to the government actors to whom they
delegated it." (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted».
180. See BeVier & Harrison, supra note 179, at 1793-95.
181. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 265 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
182. U.S. CaNST. art. IV, § 4.
183. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A
New Role/or the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 815, 819-22 (1994). Many state
constitutions include accountability clauses. Freeman, supra note 22, at 93.
184. Although the founders were influenced by the writings of multiple political thinkers,
historians have identified Montesquieu as the most influential, particularly in matters of
constitutional design. See Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on
Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 189, 192

1374

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1347

comprised of separated powers-legislative, executive, and adjudicative-allocated
to assemblies, a single magistrate, and judges, respectively.185 As the legislature
posed a risk of amassing too much power, it was split into two houses "on ground
that each House will keep the other in check.,,186 They also shifted power from the
legislature to a unitary presidency with veto power, salary protection, and
constraints on removal. 187 Unlike state magistrates, the President would be elected,
albeit indirectly.188 The election of a single executive created a more direct line of
accountability to the pUblic. 189 The third branch-the judiciary-would be selected
by both the President and the Senate, rather than by just one branch. 190 Thus, "each
branch of government should have some direct or indirect democratic basis.,,191
This system of separated powers was necessary, as Madison famously stated in
Federalist No. 51, as "[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.,,192 Because
the system of checks and balances made direct appeals unnecessary,193 Madison
anticipated that government would function in a grinding fashion, through constant
compromises, to provide the people the most security. 194
Accountability and the idea of government by the people thus operate as
reciprocals: because the people retain the ultimate power of government, those who
hold public power must be accountable to the populace. Likewise, in order for there
to be accountability under our Constitution, the source of federal power-the
people-must have some say in how it is exercised. The readiness of the populace
to accept the Constitution itself reflects a consensus about procedure-not
substance. 195 "We the People" agreed through the Constitution on "fair terms of
cooperation for their own sake [as] an essential social virtue."I96 Such terms
operate to check against the illegitimate exercise of power. People accept the
Constitution because it establishes a "specifically constituted, democratically
deliberative lawmaking system to which all primary legal content is constantly

(1984); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926) (citing James Madison,
Thursday, July. 19. in Convention, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 51, 56 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) ("Montesquieu's view that the maintenance of

independence as between the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches was a
security for the people had [convention members'] full approval.")).
185. See Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583.
186. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (citing THE FEDERALIST
No. 63 (James Madison)).
187. Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583.
188. See U.S. CON ST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1-3; see also Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583-84.
189. See Bruff, supra note 176, 508.
190. See Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583-84.
191. 1d. at 1583.
192. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Jan Shapiro ed., 2009).
193. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 50 (James
Madison).
194. See Hans A. Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO.
L. REv. 709, 730 (1994) ("Madison and Wilson relied on elected representatives to defuse, to
compromise, and, at best, to prevent the abuse of government power from motives of
personal self-interest or majoritarian passion.").
195. Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1063, 1070
(2000).
196. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54 (Columbia Univ. Press 1996).
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accountable.,,197 The Constitution binds generations to this way of doing
business. 198 If the Constitution were not immutable, it would be useless beyond the
politics of the moment. 199
Moreover, the system assumes that the populace is safer if government adheres
to principles of constitutional structure even if it is cumbersome to do so and even
if departures from that structure seem innocuous. 2oo Accountability structures
promote public access, responsiveness, sound policy, and rationality in decision
making. 201 They also serve to squelch "the potential of tyrannical use of
government power over the people.,,202 Ideally, self-interest and corruption, which
destabilize the political system, are marginalized?03
In sum, the Constitution sets forth a procedural framework for the definition and
allocation of the people's power to self-govern-one to which the populace has
consented. When Congress or the executive branch sub-delegates their powers to a
private party, the powers themselves do not morph into something "private"; they
retain their fundamental character as powers derived from the people through the
Constitution. As a consequence, the Constitution is the guiding force behind the
exercise of any power that flows through it from the people-even if that power's
chain of delegation leads to private hands.

197. Michelman, supra note 195, at 1071.
198. See James O. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 307, 311 (1976).
199. See id. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(rejecting Maryland's attempt to tax the Second Bank of the United States and holding that
the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass laws not specifically enumerated
in the Constitution).
200. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62, 65 n.11
(1990).
20 I. See Freeman, supra note 19, at 665. The bureaucracy that enables government to act
predictably and fairly also hampers innovation and flexibility. See David M. Lawrence,
Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 654 (1986).
202. Barbara Hinkson Craig & Robert S. Gilmour, The Constitution and Accountability
for Public Functions, 5 GoVERNANCE 46, 48 (1992) ("Ironically this fundamental purposeto protect the people from the tyrannous exercise of power-is the one more ignored in
contemporary debate and analysis."); see also Lawrence, supra note 201, at 661 (observing
that the public accountability considerations implied by the Constitution's structure include
Article Ill's provisions for judicial review, which protect against deprivations of due process
and prevent private interests from dominating the exercise of public power). The Supreme
Court has hawkishly protected against congressional attempts to aggrandize its own power.
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-59 (1983) (invalidating a provision for a one-house
veto in the Immigration and Nationality Act). Indeed, the anti-aggrandizement principle is
the only real limitation on congressional power that has survived the demise of the
nondelegation doctrine. See Craig & Gilmour, supra, at 59.
203. See Lawrence, supra note 201, at 661-62.
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2. Characteristics of Accountability to the Public

Although the Supreme Court has not expressly recognized a constitutional
accountability doctrine, the Constitution's procedural architecture gives rise to
substantive criteria for the exercise of public power. Repeatedly, the starting point
for doctrinal analysis of express constitutional provisions is an abiding respect for
the people's power and public accountability. Read together, these decisions reveal
at least three definitional characteristics of constitutional accountability. The first is
that the people's power must be exercised on behalf of the common good and not
out of self-interest. The second is identity transparency-the public should be clear
on whether it is dealing with a private contractor versus a government actor. Third,
the public should be informed of contractors' responsibilities and performance to
facilitate public participation in the outsourcing process. 204
a. Acting in the Public Interest
Implicit in the concept of "We the People" is the almost moralistic assumption
that government actors are entrusted to do the right thing on behalf of the common
good. 205 The question of whether government is "honest or corrupt ... dedicated to
the public good or overtaken by faction,,206 was in the foreground of the founders'
decision to form a republic?07 This brand of government does not necessarily
mirror public sentiments in the political sense but will champion the public interest
even if that means alienating a dominant political faction?08 It forbears pure
democracy in the interest of something greater. The oath of office taken by many
federal officials-with its regular reference to protecting and defending the
Constitution-is fashioned to instill in public actors this "sixth sense" of
accountability that is absent from private sector contractual arrangements. 209
Mainstream due process and equal protection precedents imply such a public
interest component of constitutional accountability to the people. The Court has
required that an asserted government interest serves the public good, rather than
merely private interests or biases, in order to qualify as "legitimate" under the
rational basis test. 210 Cass Sunstein has expanded this concept to identify a theory

204. These factors are not necessarily exclusive.
205. See Mulgan, supra note 13, at 557 (discussing discourse around a public servant's
"inner responsibility ... to his or her conscience or moral values").
206. Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A
Constitutional AnalYSis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 596,617 (1989).
207. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
208. See Shane, supra note 206, at 614.
209. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[The oath taken by Executive
Branch officials] is a solemn undertaking, a binding of the person to the cause of
constitutional government, an expression of the individual's allegiance to the principles
embodied in that document. Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a government
lawyer therefore cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.").
210. See, e.g., Romerv. Evans, 517 U.s. 620,634 (1996) ("[A] bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." (omission
in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
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of "naked preferences," which he argues the Constitution was designed to avoid. 211
The naked preferences theory bans the "distribution of resources or opportunities to
one group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have
exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want.,,212 It is a common
theme in the doctrinal tests that have developed under "many of the most important
clauses of the Constitution: the dormant commerce, privileges and immunities,
equal protection, due process, contract, and eminent domain clauses.,,213 All of
these constitutional provisions have been construed to filter out "discrimination
based on an impermissible purpose.,,214

534-35 (1973))); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47
(1985) ("[S]ome objectives-such as 'a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,'-are not legitimate state interests" for equal protection purposes. (omission in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 53435 (finding that "a purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and
without reference to some ... considerations in the public interest, justify [the statute]" on
equal protection grounds); Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the
Promise of Lawfol Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 283, 325 (2012) (observing that
"[b]ecause the statute [in Lawrence] did not realistically advance any genuine public good, it
was simply an arbitrary attempt to 'demean' adults 'who, with full and mutual consent from
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle'" (quoting
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003))). See generally Timothy Sandefur, Insiders,
Outsiders, and the American Dream: How Certificate ofNecessity Laws Harm Our Society's
Value, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 381, 423 (2012) ("[E]ven the cases
applying the most lenient level of scrutiny to government action have almost always required
that the government serve public-oriented goals-generally referred to as the protection of
public health, safety, and welfare-rather than for private interests." (emphasis in original)).
211. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689
(1984); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 25-37 (1998).
212. Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1689.
213. Id. (footnotes omitted).
214. Id. at 1690 (footnotes omitted). Professor Sun stein explains:
The privileges and immunities clause, for example, prohibits a state from
preferring its citizens over outsiders unless there are perfectly valid independent
reasons for the preference. The dormant commerce clause allows discrimination
against interstate commerce, with its attendant costs to out-of-staters, only if the
discrimination is a means of promoting some goal unrelated to protectionism.
The equal protection clause allows a state to distinguish between one person
and another only if there is a plausible connection between the distinction and a
legitimate public purpose. The contract clause does not forbid an impairment of
contractual obligations if the impairment is the incidental consequence of a
generally applicable rule of conduct designed to promote legitimate
government goals.
Id. at 1689-90 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Other scholars have
similarly observed that the "public use" inquiry under the Takings Clause "focuses on the
government's actual ends-that is, the goal it was actually trying to achieve by taking
property." Eduardo M. Pefialver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due
Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 305, 324 n.79 (2012) (emphasis in original) (citing Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478, 479-81 (2005) ("Nor would the City be allowed to
take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to
bestow a private benefit.")).
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Another way of viewing the widespread requirement that a legitimate public
interest animate government decision making is to consider it substantive due
process in the reverse. While substantive due process requires that government
interference in a fundamental right be justified by a sufficient purpose, the
government's "right" to take actions that affect individual citizens must
correlatively be grounded in a legitimate public purpose to be valid in the first
instance. 215
Professor Sunstein links the naked preferences ban to the framers' "fear that
government power would be usurped solely to distribute wealth or opportunities to
one group or person at the expense of another.,,216 Constitutional doctrine that
rejects naked preferences for powerful groups thus serves as "a means ... of
ensuring that government action results from a legitimate effort to promote the
public good rather than from a factional takeover.,,217 Moreover, "[t]he notion that
government actions must be responsive to something other than private pressure is
associated with the idea that politics is ... the transcending of the different interests
of the society in the search for the single common good.,,218 The naked preferences
theory logically flows into the idea that anyone who exercises power derived from
the people through the Constitution, therefore, must do so pursuant to legitimate
government purposes, which do not include pure self-interest or corporate profit.
In Young v. United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,219 the Supreme Court
expressly relied upon the normative idea of government in the public interest to
reverse a criminal conviction for contempt. The district court entered an injunction
pursuant to a settlement of a trademark infringement suit. After a private sting
operation revealed a possible violation of the injunction, the court appointed the
plaintiffs lawyers as special counsel to prosecute a criminal contempt action,
which resulted in a jury conviction.220 The Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's
duty to the public interest disqualified private attorneys from prosecuting a
violation of a court order benefiting their civil client. 221 Quoting its rebuke of
prosecutorial misconduct in Berger v. United States,222 the Court declared federal
prosecutors "the representative[s] ... of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest ... is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."m Because

215. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (finding statute that criminalized private homosexual
conduct a violation of substantive due process where "[t]he Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual").
216. Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1690.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1691 (citation omitted) (quoting GoRDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REpUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted».
219. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
220. See id. at 789-91.
221. Id. at 802-09.
222. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
223. Young, 481 U.S. at 803 (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at 88).
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the private attorneys appointed in Young were not "as disinterested as a public
prosecutor," 224 the Court reversed?25
Notably, the Court was persuaded by ''the potential for private interest to
influence the discharge of public duty,,,226 regardless of the facts. It found that
"[p]ublic confidence in the disinterested conduct of [such an] official is
essential"-particularly when "expansive powers and wide-ranging discretion" are
involved 227-and struck a sharp contrast between the motivations of government
actors versus private ones. Whereas "[t]he government's interest is in dispassionate
assessment" of criminal charges, a private party might prosecute a weak case or
turn a blind eye to a strong one if either course "promises financial or legal rewards
for the private client."m In Young, therefore, the Court fashioned nonconstitutional doctrine around the policy objective of ensuring that the people's
power is exercised on their behalf, that is, of "hav[ing] assurance that those who
would wield [prosecutorial] power will be guided solely by their sense of public
responsibility for the attainment ofjustice.,,229
Concededly, the precise holding in Young created a "categorical rule against the
appointment of an interested prosecutor" rather than a working doctrine of
disinterested government. 230 In New York v. United States,231 however, the Court
applied the Tenth Amendment to similarly confine the powers of a constitutional
branch-Congress, in that case-due to "the possibility that powerful incentives
might lead ... officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in their
personal interests."m The question in New York was whether Congress could
legislatively commandeer a state to dispose of radioactive waste. The Court said
no,233 in part because members of Congress had an interest in avoiding the
"personal responsibility" they would face from constituents if they passed federal
legislation that identified radioactive disposal sites instead?34 Under such
circumstances, it reasoned, "[t]he interests of public officials thus may not coincide
with the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation ofauthority."m
Young and New York thus lend support to the idea that federal power should be
primarily exercised in a manner that benefits the interests of the public. This
foundational principle does not wither away simply because an executive branch
officer or employee decides to hire a private party to perform a public function
contractually. To the extent that a private party exercises federal powers, structural
constraints must be in place to ensure that private interests do not trump the public
good.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 804.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 805 (emphasis in original).
Jd. at 813.
Id. at 805.
Jd. at 814 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Jd.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id. at 182.
See id. at 149.
Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 183.
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b. Identity Transparency
A second component of accountability to the people is what one might call
"identity transparency." This factor is implicit in the Court's federalism
jurisprudence, which contains express assertions of a constitutional accountability
principle in that context. 236 More particularly, the Supreme Court has invalidated
federal regulation of state government for confusing the public as to who to blame
for malfeasance. 237 Private contracting similarly muddles the public's ability to
hold political actors accountable for abuses of federal power.238
Three cases especially support the idea that governmental powers should be
allocated in such a way as to make clear who is responsible for actions taken on
behalf of the people. In FERC v. Mississippi,239 Justice O'Connor dissented from
the majority's decision to uphold federal regulation of state utility regulatory
agencies under the Tenth Amendment. 24o She wrote at length on "the most valuable
aspects of our federalism," which enable citizens to hold their local utilities
accountable for their actions. 241 Unlike federal preemption, she reasoned,
"[c]ongressional compulsion of state agencies [to carry out federal regulation] blurs
the lines of political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their
representatives are no longer responsive to local needs.,,242
Later, in New York and Printz v. United States/43 the Court embraced Justice
O'Connor's theory of accountable government transparency while striking down
federal legislation regulating the states. As noted previously, New York involved a
challenge to a statute requiring states either to enact legislation providing for the
disposal of radioactive waste or take title to it. The Court found the legislation
unconstitutional in light of the dual sovereignty principle embodied in the Tenth
Amendment, explaining that, "where the Federal Govemment compels States to
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.,,244
Under the statute in question, the states "b[ore] the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.,,245 As a result,
"[a]ccountability is ... diminished.,,246 New York thus indicates that government

236. See generally Beennann, supra note 8, at 1507, 1515-16 (suggesting that an
accountability doctrine can be erected "in relatively short order" from Tenth Amendment
cases).
237. Id. at 1515-16.
238. See id.
239. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
240. See generally id. at 775-97 (O'Conner, l, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. Id. at 787-88.
242. Id. at 787.
243. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
244. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
245. Id. at 169.
246. Id. The Court elaborated:
[W]hile it would be well within the authority of either federal or state officials
to choose where the disposal sites will be, it is likely to be in the political
interest of each individual official to avoid being held accountable to the voters
for the choice of location. If a federal official is faced with the alternatives of
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power cannot be formulated in such a way as to pass the buck, as it were, or to
confuse the public as to who is responsible for a particular action.
From "the Tenth Amendment's assertion that 'the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution ... are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people, '" the Court again identified a principle of public accountability in
Printz. 247 Printz involved a constitutional challenge to the Brady handgun law,
which required local law enforcement to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun buyers?48 Finding no constitutional text addressing the
propriety of congressional attempts to compel state officers to execute federal
laws,249 the Court turned to the Constitution's structure to "discern among its
'essential postulate[s]' a principle that controls.,,25o To that end, Justice Scalia
wrote for the Court that "[t]he Constitution . . . contemplates that a State's
government will represent and remain accountable to its own citizens.,,251 The
Brady statute allowed Congress to evade public accountability for its effects;
Congress could take credit for "'solving' problems" related to handguns without
raising federal taxes, while at the same time putting states "in the position of taking
the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.,,252
Printz underscores that the Constitution's structure gives rise to essential
principles that, though not express in its text, can do real doctrinal work in
evaluating reallocations of power. One such principle is the requirement of identity
transparency. To the extent that a reallocation of power obscures clear lines of
responsibility, it may unconstitutionally render the exercise of those powers
unaccountable to the people. This element of constitutional accountability to the
people can and should be extended to constrain the federal practice of outsourcing.
c. Public Disclosure and Responsive Government
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence suggests a third element
of public accountability: that those who exercise the people's power should
disclose information as to how that power is being exercised. Without such
transparency, responsive and adaptive government cannot exist. Although the
Constitution "lacks a general-purpose public access provision, a special procedure
for enacting laws affecting public access, or an explicit obligation to pass such
iegislation,,,253 the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated in First Amendment

choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer
the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision.
!d. at 182-83.
247. 521 U.S. at 919 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
248. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III, IV), (s)(2)
(2006).
249. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
250. Id. at 918 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Principality of Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)).
251. Id. at 920 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549,576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, l, concurring)).
252. Id. at 930.
253. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for
Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REv. 909, 932 (2006); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
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cases that it is "well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas.,,254 The Court has accordingly characterized the framers'
intention behind the First Amendment as "assur[ing] unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.,,255 The ability of the people to speak and debate freely operates to ensure
that government remains responsive and accountable to the people?56
Repeatedly, the Court has equated First Amendment rights with the central idea
of public accountability. In Gravel v. United States, it noted that the First
Amendment protects not just speakers but listeners-a protection that aids public
access to information about government and thus its ability to hold government
accountable. 257 The Court in Stromberg v. California highlighted the importance of
"free political discussion" to democratic accountability, "to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic,
[which] is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.,,258 In New York
Times v. Sullivan, it noted that the First Amendment protects freedom of speech
and dissemination of ideas that is ''uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" because
public debate ensures that government can be changed. 259 Likewise, in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,260 Justice Jackson wrote fervently
about the First Amendment's role in ensuring an accountable government, as
438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information
within the government's control."). Adam Samaha observes, however, that, "[t]hree justices
dissented [in Houchins], stressing their opposition to total denial of public access to
information about jail operations." Samaha, supra, at 942 n.151 (citing Houchins, 438 U.S.
at 29-39) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
254. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("[W]here a speaker
exists, ... the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients
both. This is clear from the decided cases."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966)
("[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 77 (1964) ("The public-official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow
of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, anything
which might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant."); Samaha, supra note 253,
at 941-42 ("One can logically read the Amendment as promoting a system of
communication in which audiences possess interests in parity with speakers. In fact, the
Court had long accepted listeners' First Amendment interests. And the judiciary was
indicating that 'political speech' and 'robust' debate on 'public issues' were at the core of its
concerns." (footnotes omitted)).
255. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (citing a 1774 letter by the
Continental Congress in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)); accord
Mills, 384 U.S. at218-19.
256. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); Mills, 384 U.S. at 219; cf
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 640-41 (1972).
257. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 640-41 (quoting U.S. Senator Sam Ervin anecdotally).
258. 283 U.S. 359, 369 (193 I).
259. 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citing Whitney v.
California, 247 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)).
260. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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"[a]uthority
is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by
authority.,,261 Justice Brandeis, in a concurring opinion in Whitney v. Calijornia,262
similarly described the origins of the First Amendment as intending to protect
minorities against "the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities," to ensure
broad debate, and to allow for lawful correction of government. 263 Most recently, in
Citizens United v. FEC/ 64 Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that "[s]peech is
an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials
accountable to the people," as it creates ''transparency [that] enables the electorate
to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages. ,,265
The Supreme Court has thus construed the Free Speech Clause as enabling the
citizenry to correct government through wide-open debate. This exchange of ideas
renders government accountable and responsive to the people. To be sure, a
constitutional accountability doctrine should not be construed to confer private
liability for First Amendment violations (or otherwise upend the state action
doctrine) or to constitutionalize the FOIA in individual cases. But the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence gives some definition to what public accountability
encompasses: the public's ability to debate and react to how the government
exercises power. Doctrinally, it suggests that the government's decision to hand off
power to private contractors, as well as the exercise and management of that power,
must be sufficiently transparent to enable a debate of ideas that creates a responsive
government. 266 Absent minimal disclosure of information relating to the scope and
execution of contractors' federal responsibilities, the use of public opinion to
correct government is frustrated.
B. Accountability to the President
Missing from the foregoing discussion of the meaning of constitutional
accountability is the visceral idea that, without mechanisms for punishing
wrongdoers, accountability cannot exist. This concept is both inherent in the
Constitution's structure and woven into Supreme Court case law addressing the
constitutionality of departures from the express three-branch apparatus. Because
they reveal themselves in connection with a distinct line of accountabilityaccountability to the President-retributive systems are dealt with in this subpart,
which goes on to specifically suggest that accountability to the President requires

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 641.
274 U.S. at 357.
Id. at 375-76.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Id. at 898, 916. The Citizens United decision is controversial because the Court

granted these rights to corporations and refused to distinguish between natural persons and
corporations. Id. at 929-31 (Stevens, l, dissenting); see also id. at 925-29 (Scalia, l
concurring) ("The Amendment is written in terms of 'speech,' not speakers.").
266. This is not to say that matters of national security entrusted to the President must be
made public if public contractors are involved. The argument is that public and private
employees acting at the public's behest should be treated similarly for purposes of fostering
the democratic norms reflected in the First Amendment.
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removability and a clear supervisory chain of command to the highest executive
officeholder.
1. Foundations of Accountability to the President
As the majority of federal contracts involve executive branch agencies,267 the
concept of accountability to the President is particularly salient for purposes of the
outsourcing debate. The sources of this requirement are Article II and the more
common democratic notion that the President's subordinates are indirectly
accountable to the public by virtue of the people's ability to vote him out of office.
a. Article II
Article II embodies accountability to the President in several places. First, the
term "executive Power" in Article II's Vesting Clause implies broad presidential
power to supervise and control the use of that power by nongovernmental actors. 268
Second, the directive that the President "take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,,269 suggests that the President must retain sufficient authority to manage a
private party's exercise of executive power if he is to fulfill the President's
constitutional obligations of executive branch fidelity to the law.270
Third, the Appointments Clause specifies the procedure for appointing "Officers
of the United States.,,271 The President appoints principal officers "with the [a]dvice
and [c]onsent of the Senate," whereas Congress may empower the President alone,
a court, or a department head to appoint inferior officers. 272 As Justice Souter has
observed, by dividing the appointment process between the President and the
Senate, the Appointments Clause sets up a system of checks and balances that
works to "ensure accountability.,,273 The Court reinforced the accountability
function of the Appointments Clause in Freytag v. Commissioner,274 in which it
held that the Tax Court, although an Article I court of limited jurisdiction, is a
"court of law" empowered to appoint special trial judges within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause. The Court stated that "[t]he Framers understood ... that by
limiting the appointment power, they could ensure that those who wielded it were

267. See Verkuil, supra note 81, at 436-37.
268. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
269. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
270. See Shane, supra note 206, at 600--01.
271. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
272. Id. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, 139 (1976), the Court held that an
appointee exercising "significant authority" pursuant to the laws of the United States is an
officer of the United States who, unlike lesser functionaries, must be appointed in the
manner prescribed by the Constitution. To the extent that private contractors fall within the
scope of this definition, an Appointments Clause challenge could conceivably arise. This
Article relies on Article II case law to develop a doctrine of constitutional accountability;
analyzing the propriety of outsourcing under Article II per se is beyond its scope.
273. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 186 (1994) (Souter, 1., concurring).
274. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
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accountable to political force and the will of the people.,,275 Although the
Constitution's text says nothing of the President's removal power, the Supreme
Court has long made it clear that, for similar reasons, the President has the
constitutional power to remove federal officers as well. 276
Fourth, although there is considerable debate over the scope of presidential
power,277 a unitary executive theorist might point to the placement of a single
person at the head of the Executive Branch as support for the importance of
accountability to the President. 278 In Printz, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that
the framers insisted on a unified executive "to ensure both vigor and
accountability," and "[t] hat unity would be shattered, and the power of the
President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively
without the President as with him .... ,,279 Similarly, in his Morrison v. Olson 280
dissent, Justice Scalia assailed the majority's upholding of the independent counsel
law because the statute set in motion a process ''that is not in the full control of
persons 'dependent on the people,' and whose flaws cannot be blamed on the
President.,,281 If things went wrong with the investigation, he complained, "there
would be no one accountable to the public to whom the blame could be assigned,"

despite what "the Founders envisioned when they established a single Chief

275. Id. at 884. Harold Krent has further suggested that privatization undermines the
Appointments Clause by permitting Congress to "exercise both a de facto appointment and
removal authority" when it creates an office for contractors and designates an office holder
extraconstitutionally. Krent, supra note 200, at 78.
276. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding the President has the absolute
authority to fire a principal executive officer). The Supreme Court later upheld legislative
restrictions on the President's removal power. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958) (preventing President Eisenhower from removing member of War Crimes
Commission without cause because of the quasi-judicial nature of the Commissioner's
duties); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding restrictions on
President's ability to appoint and remove members of the Federal Trade Commission).
277. Compare Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 1231, 1241-46 (1994) (describing scholarly debate over whether Article II Vesting
Clause requires presidential control over agencies' discretionary authority or whether
Congress may vest such authority in subordinate officers free from direct control of the
President), Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 521, 527
(2005) (defining executive power as including the authority to oversee prosecutions), and
David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch
Ruiemaking, 7 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 309, 317-20 (1993) (arguing that executive power grants
broad authority to steer policymaking), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 20--32 (1994) (debunking the
unitary executive theory and arguing that, historically, prosecutors were not answerable to
the President; nor were all Departments according to the framing Congress).
278. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728-29 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
279. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,922-23 (1997) (citing FEDERALIST No. 70
(Alexander Hamilton»; accord 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 495 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1976) (statement of James Wilson».
280. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
281. [d. at 729 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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Executive accountable to the people: the blame can be assigned to someone who
can be punished. ,,282
b. The Franchise
Of course, Article II's provisions for effectuating accountability to the people
have no effect unless means exist to enforce them. 283 Citizens' ability to choose the
President to whom they have delegated power through Article II further supports a
requirement of constitutional accountability for those who exercise that power.
Madison expressly associated accountability with elections in Federalist No. 52. 284
If the President abuses his executive authority, or if those whom he appoints abuse
executive powers, the people can fire the President. 285 A new President would be
positioned to appoint officers who, at her command, would better effectuate the
public's intentions. The power of the franchise thus suggests that private parties
who enter into contractual arrangements with a member of the executive branch
must be situated within the President's chain of command so that, if the contractors
err, the President can take responsibility for miscreants and citizens can hold the
chief executive accountable at the voting booth.
2. Characteristics of Accountability to the President
The constitutional imperative of accountability to the President has dual
definitional parts: while the President must have the power to remove subordinates,
subordinates must also be situated within his supervisory chain of command. These
factors enable the President-and the citizenry through the process of electing a
new President-to punish wrongdoing by anyone who exercises the power of the
people, regardless of whether the actors hold private or public status.
a. Removal
The Court has recognized the President's removal power as an important tool
for effectuating control over subordinates and holding them accountable. 286 It

282. Id. at 731 (emphasis in original).
283. See id. (observing that "a single Chief Executive accountable to the people" means
that "the blame can be assigned to someone who can be punished").
284. THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison) ("[I]t is particularly essential that [the
legislative branch] should have an immediate dependence on, & an intimate sympathy with
the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence
and sympathy can be effectually secured.").
285. Scholars debate the meaningfulness of the electoral process. See generally Ethan J.
Leib & Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and
Popular Democrats Need Parties, 100 CAL. L. REv. 69, 86 n.8l (2012) (citing competing
scholarship showing that "the political science discipline is not of one mind about the
possibilities for retrospective accountability").
286. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 315155, 3164 (2010) (holding that two layers of for-cause removal is unconstitutional because
"[t]he President['s] ... ability to execute the laws-by holding his subordinates accountable
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stands to reason that the desire to keep a job motivates employees to comply with
an employer's requirements. Justice Scalia recognized this concept in Printz when
he pondered whether the President could feasibly control those who execute the
laws "without the power to appoint and remove.,,287 In turn, employers hold their
hires accountable through the threat of removal partly because bad performance
reflects poorly on them. Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged this convention in
Marbury v. Madison, noting that the President is accountable for the exercise of
discretion that includes appointment decisions and that his subordinates are
accountable to him. 288
Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has identified the Vesting Clause and the Take
Care Clause as grounding the notion that the President must have the power to fire
subordinates so he can hold them (and the public can hold him) accountable. In
Printz, the Court emphasized that, although the Constitution empowers the
President to execute the law, the Brady legislation "effectively transfer[red]" this
power to state law enforcement officers "who [we]re left to implement the program
without meaningful Presidential control.,,289 Printz thus suggests that the exercise
of executive authority must be controllable through the President's removal power
not just as a matter of the Appointments Clause; his ability to meet his
constitutional obligations under the Vesting and Take Care Clauses also hinges on
that power.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in Free Enterprise Fund v.
PCAOB,290 which involved an Article II challenge to Congress's creation of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in reaction to problems
with the accounting industry that were brought to light after Enron's failure. 291
Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,292 which created the PCAOB, only the SEC could
fire PCAOB members and could only do so for cause. 293 Thus, if the President
sought to control the PCAOB's exercise of delegated authority through the threat of
removal, the best he could do was fire SEC members for cause on the theory that
the SEC improperly failed to fire PCAOB members for cause.

for their conduct-is impaired"). Schoiars dispute whether the removal power actually
serves the accountability function. See Lawson, supra note 277, at 1244 ("A presidential
removal power, even an unlimited removal power, is ... either constitutionally superfluous
or constitutionally inadequate.").
287. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (emphasis added).
288. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 165--66 (1803) ("By the constitution of the United States, the
President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to
use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and
to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to
appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.").
289. 521 U.S. at 922 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3).
290. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). See generally Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract
and the Structural Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 491 (2011) (discussing Free
Enterprise Fund).
291. See generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The
PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 975, 977--78, 1007--22
(2005) (describing the powers of the PCAOB).
292. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(c), 7215 (2006).
293. Id. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217(d)(3).
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The Court struck down the so-called "double layer of for-cause removal"
provisions that insulated PCAOB members from presidential control,z94
"reaffirm[ing] the principle that Article II confers on the President 'the general
administrative control of those executing the laws. ",295 The lack of removal power,
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, denied the President the tactical
ability to "hold the Commission fully accountable for the Board's conduct,,,296
resulting in "a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is
not responsible for the Board.,,297 When this happens, an unconstitutional
interference with Article II's Vesting and Take Care Clauses occurS. 298 As the
executive power includes "the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling
laws,,,299
the
Court
suggested,
"the
those
who
execute
the
Constitution ... empower[ s] the President to keep [executive] officers
accountable.,,30o The power to remove private parties who exercise executive
power, therefore, is also central to the vitality of the President's Article II powers.
A key distinction exists between independent agencies and private contractors,
however. Congress's creation of independent agencies gives rise to separation of
powers difficulties that are not at play when the executive branch outsources its
own powers to private parties. If the executive were to afford two levels of
insulation to a private contractor without reserving policy-based grounds for its
dismissal, it would not amount to a constitutional interference with executive
power by another branch of government. The question would become whether the
executive can abdicate its own power rather than whether Congress can statutorily
confine the power of the executive. Yet under either scenario, Free Enterprise
Fund's characterization of executive power per se as including the ability to hold
subordinates accountable identifies and gives shape to the Constitution's normative
expectation of accountability to the President.

294. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164; see also id. at 3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
295. Jd. at 3152 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,164 (1926)).
296. Id. at 3154.
297. Id. at 3153; see Jonathan H. Adler, Thoughts on Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 28, 2010, 3:25 PM), http://volokh.comJ2010/06/28/
thoughts-on-free-enterprise-fund-v-pcaobl (observing that "[t]he Court drew a line in the
sand to safeguard executive power and ensure greater accountability," as it recognized that
"separation of powers is about protecting liberty by ensuring accountability, not about
protecting one branch or another for its own sake").
298. The majority accepted the parties' agreement that the SEC is removable only for
cause, despite the lack of statutory language to that effect. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct.
at 3148. Incredulous, the dissent disagreed. See id. at 3182 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("How
can the Court simply assume without deciding that the SEC Commissioners themselves are
removable only 'for cause'?" (emphasis in original)).
299. Id. at 3151 (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 463 (1789)); see also id. at
3152 ("The landmark case of Myers V. United States reaffirmed the principle that Article II
confers on the President 'the general administrative control of those executing the laws.'"
(quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 164».
300. Id. at 3146 (emphasis added).
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b. Chain of Command
Article II implies an additional characteristic of accountability to the President:
the requirement that all those who exercise executive power fall within the
President's supervisory chain of command. The Court in Free Enterprise Fund
emphasized that an "active obligation to supervise" goes along with "Article II's
vesting of the executive power in the President.,,30I The statute also offended the
Take Care Clause by compromising the President's ability to maintain "the general
administrative control of those executing the laws.,,302 Without the ability to
effectively oversee subordinates, "[t]he President is stripped of the power our
precedents have preserved, and his ability to execute the laws-by holding his
subordinates accountable for their conduct-is impaired.,,303
The Court thus held the statute unconstitutional for its "diffusion of power[,
which] carries with it a diffusion of accountability.,,304 This diffusion means that
"[ w]ithout a clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot 'determine on
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious
measures ought really to fall. ",305 This chain-of-command component of
accountability to the President is similar to the identity transparency feature of
accountability to the people, but it serves a slightly different purpose. Maintaining
within the President's chain of command all those who exercise executive power
enables the President to address malfeasance in response to public sentiment.
Indeed, the viability of removal authority itself is contingent on the existence of
traceable lines of authority. The Free Enterprise Fund Court justified its decision in
part because, if it had allowed the statute to stand, "this dispersion of responsibility
could be multiplied" allowing officers to be "immune from Presidential oversight,
even as they exercised power in the people's name.,,306 The freewheeling use of
federal power is perhaps the most pernicious kind; as such, the Constitution forbids
it.
Free Enterprise Fund thus makes a case for identifYing a stand-alone principle
of constitutional accountability to the President to properly effectuate the power
delegated by the people. It recognizes that the very structure of the Constitution is
synonymous with accountability. While the President must, as a practical matter, be
able to hold accountable those who execute the law, his power of oversight and

301. Id. at 3154 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712-13 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment».
302. Id. at 3152 (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 164); see also id. at 3147 (noting that "[t]he
President cannot 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' if he cannot oversee the
faithfulness of the officers who execute them"); id. at 3154 ("Without the ability to oversee
the Board, or to attribute the Board's failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is
no longer the judge of the Board's conduct") (emphasis in original).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 3155.
305. Id. (quoting FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton».
306. Id. at 3154. Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia
objected to the independent counsel statute's assignment of "purely executive
functions ... to a person whose actions are not fully within the supervision and control of
the President." 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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control falls squarely within the definition of executive power. Hence, an
outsourcing arrangement to private parties can only be constitutional if, first, the
President retains-through removal-the ability to hold accountable private
contractors who exercise executive power, and second, the delegation of power is
not so disbursed that the President cannot reasonably oversee his inferiors. Absent
this ability, the President cannot take care that the laws are faithfully executed.
III. BUILDING AN ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK
The Constitution vests the power of the people in three branches of government
and sets up a structure for ensuring that their occupants remain accountable to the
people. There are no caveats to this architecture that would convert the President's
executive power into private power when delegated to private parties. The vested
powers retain their constitutional character always and everywhere. Thus, some
constitutional framework for the structuring of privatized government is minimally
in order. 307
This Article has endeavored to locate a principled system for configuring federal
outsourcing in a doctrine of constitutional accountability. Parts I and II argued that
constitutional accountability can be derived from the procedural framework
embedded in the Constitution, with each of the doctrine's characteristics rooted in
the foundational concept that all power stems from the people.
This Part wrestles with the practical implications of a constitutional
accountability principle. It revisits the scenarios introduced in Part I to explore how
constitutional accountability could bring scrutiny to the structuring of outsourcing
decisions that implicate the power to self_govern. 308 It starts from the visceral
assumption that McDonald's does not raise constitutional accountability concerns,
but that Blackwater and TSA do. From this crude distinction, it identifies a
threshold question for a doctrinal framework for constitutional accountability: Is a
contractor exercising constitutionally delegated, executive powers? If the ready
answer is no, as in the case of McDonald's, the inquiry ends. If the answer is yes,
as in the cases of Blackwater and TSA contractors, the question becomes whether a
particular contractual relationship between the government and a private contractor
reflects sufficient indicia of accountability to satisfy constitutional concerns.
This Part then addresses how one might inject elements of constitutional
accountability into federal contracts like those with Blackwater or the private

307. Jody Freeman similarly suggests a process of "publicization," whereby private
contractors are embraced and brought within mainstream legislative, executive,
judicial, and social oversight norms. Freeman, supra note 22, at 83-84.
308. Others have made proposals for enhancing contractor accountability as well. See,
e.g., VERKUIL, supra note 67, at 103-12, 149-50, 165-69 (suggesting that some functions
cannot be outsourced on separation of powers and Appointments Clause grounds, that due
process precludes delegations to private parties with conflicts of interest, that Circular A-76
and the FAR could be amended, and that political appointees could be decreased and highly
skilled government employees increased); Freeman, supra note 22, at 93 (reiterating that
courts could scrutinize contracts to ensure adequate legislative supervision); Metzger, supra
note 85, at 1456 (arguing for a flexible inquiry into whether delegations are adequately
structured to preserve accountability).
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companies performing airport security for TSA. It leaves for future research and
analysis a number of important related questions, such as has how to precisely map
the pertinent policy considerations into manageable criteria for judges, who would
have standing to bring a suit challenging a federal outsourcing contract on
constitutional grounds, the institutional and societal costs of a working doctrine of
constitutional accountability, and the possible remedies for violations, including
whether liability would attach to public actors, private actors, or both.

A. The Trigger: Federal Executive Power
Not all government contracts raise accountability issues of constitutional
dimension. This subpart accordingly posits that a contract should be initially
scrutinized for constitutional accountability if one of two triggers exist: First, a
contract delegates to private parties executive power under the Constitution's
express terms, or, second, a contract affords to a private party the ability to exercise
enforcement power in a manner that could lead to a realistic risk of interference
with civil liberties.
To begin with, Article II of the Constitution provides that executive power
minimally encompasses negotiating treaties, directing troops in battle, making
pardon decisions, and appointing "Officers.,,309 Although scholars continue to
debate the constitutionality of per se delegations of express constitutional powers,
suffice it to say that settled doctrine leaves that debate more theoretical than real.
As Parts I and II explain, therefore, an alternative constitutional theory for reining
in federal outsourcing is warranted. Such a theory springs from the Constitution's
structure, which is based on the principle that those who exercise federal powers
will be accountable to the people and the President. As a consequence, private
contractors should not be empowered to exercise the President's express
constitutional functions unless mechanisms are in place to establish such lines of
accountability. Put another way, if the terms of a contract effectively outsource
Article II's textual powers to a private party, the second element of constitutional
accountability, discussed in the next subsection, applies.
The other trigger for a constitutional accountability requirement arises under
Article II's requirement that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,,,310 and the Appointments Clause's3\l specification of the processes for
appointing federal officers. The Supreme Court has indicated that the President's
power "'to enforce the[ laws] or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such
enforcement . . . are executive functions.",312 The power to execute the laws
"necessarily [encompasses] power to command obedience, preserve order, and

309. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1-2. See generally Brown, supra note 290, at 514-15.
310. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
311. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
312. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 139 (1976) (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands,
277 U.S. 189,202 (1928)). But cf Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) ("Our
cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for [defining] inferior officers."); United States
v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1878) (defining inferior officers as those who can hold
office).
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keep the peace.,,313 The outsourcing of law enforcement powers is particularly ripe
for application of a constitutional accountability requirement because of the related
implications for individual civil liberties. The Supreme Court has emphasized the
need, "in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the
constitutional safeguards of civil liberty"---even if it interferes with the President's
exercise of his military prerogatives. 314 The President consequently has no
authority, for example, "to authorize unreasonable searches and seizures" in
violation of the Fourth Amendment or any other provision of the Bill of Rights. 3i5
Before the government can empower a private contractor to exercise enforcement
power in a manner that realistically risks interference with civil liberties, therefore,
it must ensure that the contractor is similarly accountable to the people through the
political system and the Office ofPresident.316
The three contractor scenarios introduced in Part I illustrate how the two triggers
just outlined would operate in practice. The McDonald's Smithsonian contract
undoubtedly delegates none of the President's express constitutional powers to a
private party. Nor does it involve the enforcement of federal laws against individual
citizens. Private parties providing other routine services for the federal
government-such as custodial support or office supplies---do so without invoking
law enforcement powers either.
Blackwater's contracts, in contrast, involve battlefield operations, which fall
within the Constitution's explicit enumeration of presidential powers. Even the
brightest-line definition of executive power would thus render Blackwater
constitutionally accountable to the President when it engages in military operations.
The people have an interest in monitoring Blackwater's actions relating to war and
national security as well. Because the source of executive power is the people,
Blackwater's relationship with the federal government requires incidents of
democratic accountability to them as well as to the President.
The airport screening responsibilities of TSA contractors do not similarly
ensnare the President's military powers under Article II's express terms.317 TSA

313. Cunningham v.Neagle, 135 U.S. 1,61 (1890).
314. Hamdan v. Rumsfe1d, 548 U.S. 557, 588 (2006).
315. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3094 (2010).
316. I do not mean to advocate here for the expansion of the state action doctrine to cover
all contractors exercising federal governance power but rather to argue that the elements of
constitutional accountability must be in place for private actors who are in a position to
interfere with individual civil liberties.
317. For providers of services that do not fit the Constitution's textual definitions, it can
be difficult to identify the point at which contractor activity should prompt constitutional
review. Indeed, OMB has defined "inherently governmental function" with little practical
success. See AAP REpORT, supra note 17, at 393 (finding that "[a]gencies must retain core
functional capabilities that allow them to properly perform their missions and provide
adequate oversight of agency functions performed by contractors," that "[s]ome agencies
have had difficulty in determining strategically which functions need to stay within
government and those that may be performed by contractors," and that "[t]he term
'Inherently Governmental' is inconsistently applied across government agencies"); supra
notes 67, 106-11 and accompanying text. Moreover, scholars have long debated the
definition of executive power. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986
SUP. CT. REv. 41, 44 (arguing that Congress cannot deny the President the power to remove

2013]

"WE THE PEOPLE"

1393

does, however, perform law enforcement functions. To the extent that TSA
outsources its ability to exercise enforcement power in a manner that could lead to
a realistic risk of interference with civil liberties, its contracts qualify for further
constitutional scrutiny.
After 9111, Congress made TSA "responsible for security in all modes of
transportation,,,318 including the critical task of "day-to-day Federal security
screening operations for passenger air transportation.,,319 TSA must screen all those
seeking to board a commercial airline flight to ensure they are not "carrying
unlawfully a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other destructive substance.,,32o As
the D.C. Circuit explained in addressing a constitutional and statutory challenge to
TSA's use of advanced imaging technologies, "[t]he Congress generally has left it
to the agency to prescribe the details of the screening process, which the TSA has
documented in a set of Standard Operating Procedures not available to the
public.,,321 TSA promulgated regulations barring passengers from entering a
"sterile"-or departure-side-area of an airport without first complying with its
screening procedures. 322 Since 1972, such official passenger screening has included
physical searches,323 and, increasingly, it involves full body scans with
"backscatter" x_rays324 or radio frequency technologies. 325 These technologies are
"designed to produce a crude image of an unclothed person," allowing the machine
a policy-making official for refusing to comply with any presidential order that falls within
that officer's statutory duty); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation ofPowers,
and the Structure of Government, 1988 SUP. CT. REv. I, 25 (promoting a "policymaking"
standard whereby Congress cannot hinder a President's power to remove individuals for
failure to comply with his valid policy decisions).
318. 49U.S.C. § 114(d)(2006).Seegenerallyid. §§44901-45.
319. Id. § 114(e)(I).
320. Id. § 44902(a)(l).
321. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d I, 3 (D.C. Cir.
20 11). The court found no constitutional violation but remanded the case with directions that
TSA engage in notice and comment procedures. See id. at 10-11. The TSA began the notice
and comment procedures in March of 2013. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging
Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,287 (Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540). The
notice and comment procedure closed on June 24, 2013. See id.
322. See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5 (2011) ("Sterile area means a portion of an airport defined in
the airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to
which the access generally is controlled by TSA ... through the screening of persons and
property." (italics in original»; id. § 1540.107(a) ("No individual may enter a sterile area or
board an aircraft without submitting to the screening and inspection of his or her person and
accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control access to that
area or aircraft under this subchapter."). See generally M. Madison Taylor, Bending Broken
Rules: The Fourth Amendment ImplicatiOns of Full-Body Scanners in Preflight Screening,
17 RICH. J.L. & TECH.I, 5-11 (2010) (describing screening methods).
323. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled by United
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 548-49 (1980) (describing airport strip search incident).
324. See Anahad O'Connor, Airport Scanners Are Safe, Government Says, N.Y. TiMES
WELL BLOG (Feb. 29, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.coml2012/02/29/airportscanners-are-safe-govemment-says/.
325. See Q&A: Controversial Full-Body Scanners, CNN (Dec. 30, 2009, 12:34 PM),
http://www.cnn.coml20091TRAVELlI2/30/airline.terror.scanners/index.htrnl.
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operator to detect dangerous objects without touching the passenger. 326 Those who
refuse a full-body screen must opt for a physical pat down if they wish to board a
flight. 327 Screening personnel are also empowered to make warrantless arrests "if
the individual reasonably believes the individual to be arrested has committed or is
committing a felony.,,328
In the ten years since TSA's creation, "[p]at-down horror stories" have
circulated widely in response to the agency's enhanced screening procedures. 329
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reported that in November 2010
alone it received over 1000 complaints of travelers "feeling humiliated and
traumatized" by the screening process,330 which has allegedly involved "gawking
by agents," the infliction of physical harm, and graphically disturbing stories of
"unnecessary repeated touching of intimate areas.,,331 Some people felt punished
for refusing to submit to body scanners; one such woman missed her flight when
the pat down agent declared the sanitary napkin she was wearing a "foreign
object.,,332 Victims' advocates point out that "[s]exual assault survivors in
particular may experience severe panic, anxiety, stress and confusion" during the
screening process because of past traumas. 333 The ACLU has criticized TSA for the
civil liberties implications posed by other aspects of its passenger screening
procedures as well, including "[p]assenger profiling" programs that rank "the
'trustworthiness' of everyone who flies," the airline "watchlist" program, and
behavioral profiling measures reportedly used to screen would-be passengers.334
For its part, TSA has repeatedly contracted out these screening responsibilities
to private companies. 335 In February 2012, the TSA Administrator reported to
Congress that sixteen of the 450 airports under federal jurisdiction "have screening
carried out by a qualified private screening company.,,336 The president and chief

326. Elec. Privacy, 653 F.3d at 3.
327. See id.
328. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(d)(2) (2006).
329. Jay Stanley, The TSA's First 11 Years, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 30, 2012,
12:21 PM), http://www.ac1u.org!bloglnational-security-technology-and-liberty/tsas-first-I 1years.
330. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Continues to Receive Complaints About New Airport
Screening Procedures (Dec. 2, 2010), available at http://www.ac1u.orglnational-securitytechnology-and-liberty/ac1u-continues-receive-complaints-about-new-airport-screeni. On its
blog, TSA encourages passengers to file civil rights or civil liberties complaints if they
believe they were mistreated by screeners. See Bob Bums, TSA 's Civil Rights and Liberties
Program, TSA BLOG (May 2, 2012), http://blog.tsa.gov/2012/05Itsas-office-of-civil-rightsand.htm!.
331. Passengers' Stories of Recent Travel, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.ac1u.
orglpassengers-stories-recent-traveU.
332. See id.
333. Press Release, National Sexual Violence Resource Center, National Organization
Calls for End to Invasive TSA Screening Methods (Nov. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.nsvrc.orglnews/3274.
334. See Stanley, supra note 329.
335. Congress gave TSA the express statutory authority to do so. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 44920(a) (2006); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
336. Screening Partnership Program: Why Is a Job-Creating, Public-Private Partnership
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executive of Orlando Sanford International Airport reported that his airport's
unsuccessful request for TSA authorization to outsource screening "was motivated
by hundreds of complaints from passengers.,,337 As stand-ins for TSA, TSA
contractors are equally positioned to exercise executive enforcement power in a
manner that could lead to violations of individual civil liberties, such as physical
groping and unlawful profiling. Private providers of such screening services
should, accordingly, be just as structurally accountable to the people and the
President as TSA agents are as a matter of constitutional law.
Notably, private contractors may exercise government powers that are more
properly characterized as administrative,338 legislative,339 or adjudicative,34o as well.
Meeting Resistance at TSA?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the H. Comm.
on Homeland Sec., 112th Congo 2 (2012) (statement of John Pistole, Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration). Administrator Pistole added that he "did not see
any clear and substantial advantage to expanding the program." Id.
337. Ron Nixon, New Law Clears the Way for Airports to Drop T.S.A. Screeners, N.Y.
nMES, Mar. 16,2012, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2012/03/16/us/airportswith-new-law-are-freer-to-split-from-tsa.html? J= 1&.
338. Administrative power includes functions such as "rulemaking, advisory opinions,
and determinations of eligibility for [federal] funds," which are more quasi-judicial or quasilegislative in nature than are enforcement powers. Buckley V. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41
(1976).
339. Congress has many enumerated powers in the Constitution, including the powers of
the House to impeach and the Senate to convict or acquit, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5;
id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; the power to initiate appropriation measures, see id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; the
Senate's power to consent to Article II appointments and treaties, see id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; the
power to override a presidential veto, see id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; the power to create lower
federal courts and define their jurisdiction, see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § § 1, 2, cl. 2;
the power to declare war, see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; the power to admit new states to the
Union, see id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; and the power to send constitutional amendments to the
states, see id. art. V. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 5-1 (3d ed. 2000) (describing Congress's explicit and implicit powers). Chief among these
additional powers, of course, is the power to legislate, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting
"[a]lllegislative Powers herein granted ... in a Congress of the United States"); id. art. I, §
8, cl. 18 (empowering Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution" its legislative and other powers). Congress's investigative power
can also be inferred from the Constitution. See Buckley V. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976).
For purposes of defining legislative power under an accountability doctrine, the Court's
nondelegation jurisprudence is instructive, but a thorough analysis of the issue is beyond the
scope of this Article. See, e.g., Whitman V. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)
(reiterating that "when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress
must lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of discretion
(emphasis in original) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & CO. V. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409
(1928) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
340. The Constitution defines judicial power as extending to "Cases" and
"Controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I. Although private contractors do not function
as federal courts by, for example, reviewing the actions of the executive branch, see Marbury
V. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803), they do perform functions that are
adjudicative within the meaning of administrative law. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and
Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1232
(2003) (noting contractors' role in welfare program management). The APA effectively
defines adjudication as any action that is not a rulemaking and that, at the end of the
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Lockheed Martin, for example, performs "surveillance and information processing
for the CIA [and] the FBI," trains TSA agents, produces cluster bombs and nuclear
weapons, hires interrogators for U.S. prisons overseas, "manag[es] a private
intelligence network in Pakistan[,] he1p[ed] write the Afghan constitution,,,341 and
administers welfare and social security programs on behalf of the government. 342
The trigger for constitutional accountability could thus be expanded to the extent
that contractors exercise delegated functions that are judicial or legislative-as well
as executive-in nature.
It bears emphasis, in addition, that whether a function is "inherently
governmental" within OMB's existing definition 343 may depend on a multitude of
factors that apply to an individual contract worker, including how much latitude
that person has to make a decision, how much power she has to bind the
government without approval, how "extensive" the contractor's role is in a given
action, whether the action involves policy formation or directing federal employees,
and whether it involves the disposition of federal property, among others. 344 The
trigger for constitutional accountability more narrowly focuses on whether a
particular contract implicates well-defined Article II functions and law
enforcement responsibilities that implicate individual civil liberties. Just as all
people on the federal payroll who perform nongovernmental tasks are considered
federal employees,345 all individuals operating under a contract that delegates
executive power should be subject to scrutiny for constitutional accountability. A
presumption of the requirement of accountability would thus apply to all contract
employees where the terms of a contract delegate law enforcement responsibilities
or other Article II powers under existing doctrinal definitions. The Supreme Court
has probed and refined such definitions in determining the constitutionality of
legislative schemes creating independent agencies. 346 Those doctrinal templates
should be employed here as well. 347
administrative process, produces a "final disposition" of a matter involving a particular
person. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-(7) (2006).
341. William Hartung, Is Lockheed Martin Shadowing You?, THE NATION (Jan. 11,
2011), http://www.thenation.comlarticle/157626/10ckheed-martin-shadowing-you.
342. See, e.g., Catherine Donnelly, Privatization and Welfare: A Comparative
Perspective, 5 LAW & Enncs HUM. RTS. 335, 337 (2011); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal
Accountability in an Era o/Privatized Welfare, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 569, 571-72 (2001).
343. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
344. See DEP'T OF ENERGY, GC GUIDANCE ON INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
1-3 (2011), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/gcprod/documents/GC_Guidance_
on_Inherently_ Governmental]unctions_0 12411.pdf.
345. See Stephen L. Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder?,
33 PUB. CONT. LJ. 263, 272 (2004) (noting that the private sector competes with the
government for the ability to perform tasks that are not inherently governmental).
346. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-93 (1988) (assessing the
constitutionality of the independent counsel statute under Article II); Wiener v. United
States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (preventing President Eisenhower from removing a
member of War Crimes Commission without cause because of the quasi-judicial nature of
the Commissioner'S duties); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)
(upholding restrictions on the President's ability to remove members of the Federal Trade
Commission).
347. See generally Brown, supra note 290.
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In sum, the first question in testing a federal outsourcing relationship for
constitutional accountability is whether a contract delegates (1) express Article II
power or (2) law enforcement power that presents a realistic possibility of being
exercised in a way that interferes with civil liberties. If either trigger is satisfied, the
next question is what kinds of accountability controls are appropriate for inclusion
in specific contracts, a topic to which this Article now turns.
B. Contractual Incidents ofAccountability
Where federal governance power is delegated to private parties, the second step
in a constitutional accountability analysis would require that the contracts include
terms reflecting adherence to the central components of accountability to the people
and to the President. Using Blackwater and TSA contractors as examples, this
subpart discusses how the elements of accountability could be manifested and
enforced through the terms of federal government contracts and public disclosure
requirements. 348
1. Accountability to the People
Constitutional accountability to the people means at least three things: (1) that
those who exercise the power of the people act in the public interest, (2) that their
identities are transparent to the people, and (3) that the public has access to
information regarding how its government is operating so that the people can effect
change.
For federal employees, the first criterion is normatively reflected in the choice to
enter public service, which, for professional career employees in particular, can be
less lucrative than private practice-sometimes substantially so. A primary
objective of private contractors, by contrast, is to make money for their
companies. 349 Given the staying power of modem federal outsourcing, it is not an
answer to ban federal contractors from performing all but routine goods and
services altogether. Although private parties can bet on financially profiting from
federal contract work, they should assume the risk that their private interests could
be compromised when they effectively take the contractual equivalent of a federal
oath of office. Federal contracts should thus include terms that make clear that
contractors must serve the public interest, even at the expense of private financial
gain. 350 Although it is not immediately evident what "acting within the public

348. Further thought must be given to the question of how courts would apply the test's
second element to the thousands of federal contracts that exist. As with equal protection and
other constitutional doctrines, it may be appropriate and beneficial to develop tiers of
scrutiny that are tied to the relative level of federal governance power delegated to a private
contractor under step one. ct, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973)
(plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to gender classifications).
349. See Fairfax, supra note 16, at 284-86 (describing how private prosecutors may not
serve the public interest because of competing private interests).
350. For a thoughtful discussion of ethics standards for government contractors, see
generally Kathleen Clark, Ethics, Employees and Contractors: Financial Conflicts of
Interest in and out of Government, 62 ALA. L. REv. 955 (2011).
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interest" means, in the case of both Blackwater and TSA contractors it would
minimally forbid purely arbitrary actions and include respect for privacy, public
safety, and civil liberties. 351 Agencies should be legislatively required to provide
guidance and oversight regarding proper public interest objectives. They might also
employ oversight ethics boards in addition to bringing breach of contract litigation
to help ensure that "good government" policy objectives are both meaningful and
enforceable when it comes to private contractors.
Second, when the federal government engages in wars that kill Americans, the
public should know the status of the actors as private parties and who within the
federal government is in charge of them. Federal contracts should accordingly
mandate such disclosures in a manner that is consistent with competing national
security considerations. Public identification of the private status of personnel
operating under battlefield contracts could highlight the elusive distinctions
amongst the legal protections and remedies available to federal employees and the
private military. It would also make it harder for politicians to diffuse responsibility
to private contractors when things go awry, leaving them more accountable to their
constituents for the decision to outsource federal powers in the first place.
TSA currently discloses which airports contract out screening functions,352 and
it should make the identities of its contractors transparent to the public, as well. 353
Although McDonald's customers at the Air and Space Museum immediately know
they are dealing with private employees, airport travelers going through security do
not. The San Francisco airport no doubt posts prominent signs directing travelers to
remove shoes and place containers with fluids in plastic bags. Constitutional
accountability might additionally require posters or videos disclosing to passengers
that they are about to be searched by employees of a private screening company
Passengers would thus be made aware of whom to contact or sue when they are
mistreated, or whom to identify to the press or members of Congress in urging
policy changes in airport security. Although such measures could complicate
airport security in the short term as the public becomes attuned to these important
distinctions, the resulting pushback might be necessary to prompt adjustments to
the prevailing privatization model, which keeps the public largely in the dark until
a catastrophe makes headlines.
Third, the people must be made aware of how their delegated power is being
exercised. Otherwise, they lack the most basic knowledge required to hold
contractors accountable. For companies like Blackwater, a possible implication of a
public disclosure element of constitutional accountability is a requirement that the
President make public the projected use of private contractors as part of his annual
budget request and any request to commit troops under the War Powers Resolution

351. Public interest objectives might align with private firms' financial goals to the extent
that those hinge on the provision of quality security services.
352. See Screening Partnership Program, ThANsP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.
"Screening Partnership
gov/stakeholders/screening-partnership-program
(describing
Program" and providing a link to a map of participating airports).
353. Such information is not on TSA's website, see id., or on the web sites of all
participating airports. See, e.g., Airport Information, LEWISTOWN MUN. AIRPORT, http://
www.lwtairport.com/airinfo.html.

2013]

"WE THE PEOPLE"

1399

of 1973.354 Congress would then be aware of how much spending goes to private
contractors in the prior fiscal year, and political debate over appropriations would
kick in as serious questions arise. Agencies would have to justify their use of
outsourcing to an elected branch of government that is answerable to voters.
The disclosure element of accountability to the public might further require that,
in seeking to commit troops to war, the President announce the projected use of
private contractors to perform functions that otherwise would be undertaken by
military personnel. Unanticipated fallout from the stealth use of private contractors
in Iraq and Afghanistan continues. The New York Times has reported that "[m]ore
civilian contractors working for American companies than American soldiers died
in Afghanistan last year for the first time during the war," but "because many
contractors do not comply with even the current, scanty reporting requirements, the
true number of private contractor deaths may be far higher.,,355 If the American
public knew in advance of the Iraq and Afghan wars the extent to which private
contractors such as Blackwater would be fighting side-by-side with U.S. soldiers,
support for the wars or scrutiny of its progress may have taken a different tone in
public debate. Questions surrounding the manner in which military contractors are
hired and managed, as well as the proper scope of their responsibilities, are more
likely to reach the public's consciousness if they are made part of the decision to go
to war at the outset.
For TSA, a number of public disclosures would enhance accountability to the
people. On its signs revealing the identities of private contractors at a particular
airport, TSA should give notice that the legal options available in the event of a
privacy or constitutional violation are different than they would be if TSA
employees were responsible for the screening. TSA should also disclose data
regarding how well private security firms are actually diverting terrorist threats as
compared to TSA employees. 356
As a constitutional matter, a resource that is equivalent to President Obama's
initiative for revealing how the government is spending the stimulus money under
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009357 should be implemented
around federal contracting to enhance government and private contractor
accountability to the public. The Act's corresponding website, Recovery.gov, has
an "accountability" link,358 which in tum refers viewers to agency-specific OIG
reports regarding the management of recovery programs,359 including financials;36o

354. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (2006) (providing that the President can send troops into
action only by authorization of Congress or in the case of a national emergency).
355. Rod Nordland, War's Risks Shift to Contractors, N.Y. DMES, Feb. 12,2012, at AI.
356. See Mulgan, supra note 13, at 557 ("Accountability depends on the free flow of
appropriate information and on effective forums for discussion and cross-examination.").
357. Pub. L. No.lll-5, 123 Stat.ll5.SeegenerallyREcoVERy.GOv,http://www.recovery.gov.
RECOVERY.GOV,
http://www.recovery.gov/AccountabilitylPages/
358. Accountability,
Accountability.aspx.
359. All Inspectors General Reports, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/
Accountability/inspectorslPageS/oigfindings.aspx.
360. Recipient
Projects,
RECOVERY.GOV,
http://www.recovery.govtrransparency/
RecoveryData/Pages/RecipientReportedDataMap.aspx.
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to information on actions taken to address fraud, waste and abuse;361 to information
about so-called noncompliers, who received federal money but bypassed reporting
requirements;362 to GAO reports on the federal and state use of recovery funds;363
and to audits of recipients' compliance with state and federal regulations. 364 The
site also provides a breakdown of all funding by category, including education,
health, housing, unemployment benefits, and tax benefits. 365 A master link for
"interested citizens,,366 takes users to social media sites, interactive maps with
information on recovery awards by region, government press releases, and much
more. Although Acquisition.gov 367 is the leading public website for government
contracting information, it contains only coded information for contractors, not lay
citizens. According to the site, there is no central repository of federal contracting
documents. 368 A comprehensive and searchable outsourcing website should be
created to similarly shed light on the performance of TSA contractors and the
sufficiency of oversight, and to pressure agencies and individual contractors to
make good decisions under scrutiny of the public eye.
Such a website could be managed by a federal contracting analogue to OIRA, a
division of OMB that was established by Congress in 1980369 to oversee the
regulatory process and to coordinate administrative policy for the President. 370
Although theoretically controversial,371 this now-established form of presidential
oversight draws a direct line of accountability between regulatory decision making
and the President himself. An "OPRA" or Office of Privatization Review
Assessment would accordingly serve to tighten the linkages between those who
exercise federal powers and the President. In striking down the portion of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that constrained the SEC's removal of PCAOB members to a
finding of cause, the Court made such a structural adjustment in Free Enterprise
Fund--one borne out of concern over the degrees of separation between the

361. Oversight Actions, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/Accountability/
Pages/investigations.aspx.
362. Non-Compliers, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/AccountabilitylPages/
noncompliers.aspx.
363. GAO Findings, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/AccountabilitylPages/
GAOFindings.aspx.
364. Audits, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/AccountabilitylPages/Audits
.aspx.
365. Breakdown of Funding, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/
fundingoverviewlPages/fundingbreakdown.aspx.
366. I Am an Interested Citizen, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.govlPages/
audience_ citizen.aspx.
367. ACQUISITION.GOV, https:llwww.acquisition.gov.
368. See Frequently Asked Questions About FPDS-NG, ACQUISITION.GOV, https:llwww.
acquisition.gov/faqs_whataboutfPds.asp.
369. See 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006).
370. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEx. L. REv. 15,30-37 (2010).
371. See Robert V. Percival, Who's in Charge? Does the President Have Directive
Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 2487,2488-90 (2011)
(discussing debate over whether the President has directive authority).
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exercise of executive authority and the President versus an objection to the kind of
authority delegated to the PCAOB under the statute.
2. Accountability to the President
Constitutional accountability also requires external accountability to the
President, which is reflected in the removal power and the executive chain of
command. As things currently stand, a citizen who is concerned over Blackwater's
use of government power has no democratically tethered means of effecting
change. Although the FAR provides for termination of federal contracts for
convenience or default,372 the law should recognize that Blackwater and TSA
contractors cannot constitutionally escape presidential at-will removal--or its
implications-if they are to exercise federal powers.373 In particular, the
relationship between the people and private actors who exercise government power
must be made less attenuated under the terms of federal contracts.
Perhaps the most obvious way to do this is to mandate broad presidential at-will
removal clauses in every federal contract. If the public is made aware of this
ubiquitous requirement, and the President fails to exercise it in connection with
particular contractor abuses of the public trust, the people can hold the President
accountable at the ballot box. Thus, if Blackwater were to overcharge taxpayers,
violate export regulations, or fail to adequately train employees on the public
interest objectives that govern the exercise of their delegated authority, the
President or his subordinates could terminate the contract immediately.
Accountability to the President would likewise require that TSA include
presidential at-will removal provisions in its contracts with private screening
companies.
The second element of constitutional accountability to the President-an
effective chain of command-might further require that Blackwater and TSA
contracts involving federal governance power be signed by a principal or inferior
officer within the President's close chain of command and that the officer retain
sufficient oversight to make informed termination and removal decisions, as
necessary, at the President's behest. What sufficient oversight means-and whether
constitutional accountability requires that the federal bureaucracy be expanded for
this purpose despite a tight budgetary environment-are significant issues,374 but

372. See 48 C.F.R. § 49.10 1(a) (2011).
373. Although members of independent agencies are generally removable only for cause,
such limitations are the result of bicameralism and presentment through the legislature and
have no evident place in public/private contracting relationships executed by individuals
within the executive branch who lack the constitutional power to fashion federal agencies
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original
Understanding, 121 HARv. L. REv. 689, 735 (2008).
374. Nor is the government given incentive to rigorously review Blackwater's actions to
the extent that it is uniquely capable of rapidly providing the military with a resource it
cannot produce on its own-experienced veterans of the Special Forces, complete with
security clearances. See Scahill, supra note 31 ("Blackwater has been involved with so many
sensitive operations for a decade and knows where the bodies are buried and who buried
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they do not undermine the need to ensure that contractors fall in line with the
President.
In effect, this tightening of the chain of command between the President and his
subordinates is what the Supreme Court accomplished in Free Enterprise Fund. 375
By invalidating the double for-cause provision from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
Court narrowed the linkage between the President's democratic constituency and
those at the PCAOB who exercise the people's power. 376 The Court characterized
its ruling as facilitating administrative control, the duty to supervise, and
accountability to the President. 377 Technically, the holding in Free Enterprise Fund
would only apply to the few contractors that could be characterized as "officers"
within the meaning of Article 11. 378 But as a practical matter, the PCOAB is now
positioned alongside any other SEC "employee" susceptible to termination by an
entity that is only one step removed from the President. 379 One implication of the
ruling is that federal powers must be configured in a way that enables the citizenry
to prompt change through public pressure on the President. If contracts delegating
military powers to Blackwater are executed by federal employees who are situated
many layers below the President within the deep federal bureaucracy, the
President's supervisory power is frustrated in much the same way as it was with
respect to the PCAOB.
them. Those are not the kind of people you simply cut loose without fear of consequences.").
375. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
376. The efficacy of the President's power to influence the SEC through the threat of forcause removal is subject to debate. Compare Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH.
L. REv. 1191, 1199 (2011) (discussing the D.C. Circuit's finding that there was "the
availability of practical methods of presidential influence over the SEC and the Board other
than removal or the threat of removal"), with Hans Bader, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB:
Narrow Separation-ol-Powers Ruling Illustrates that the Supreme Court Is Not "ProBusiness," CATO SUP. CT. REv., 2009-10, at 269, 275 ("[T]he president has more influence
over the SEC's chairman than he does over other commissioners. For example, the president
can reassign at will which commissioner acts as chairman, but he cannot remove a
commissioner from the commission without cause.").
377. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153-54.
378. The plaintiffs argued that PCAOB members were principal officers who must be
appointed by the President or, alternatively, that even if the PCAOB members were inferior
officers, their appointment by the SEC would be unconstitutional as the SEC was not a
department and its commissioners were not collectively a "department head" under Article
II. Id. at 3149.
379. The D.C. Circuit applied Free Enterprise Fund in declaring unconstitutional
Congress's grant of power to Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs), who are appointed to
staggered six-year terms by the Librarian of Congress and empowered to establish licensing
terms and rates of royalty payments for webcasting. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1334--35 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The court found that the
CRJs were principal officers under Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), because
they are not subject to significant supervisory constraints, Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at
1339, they are removable by the Librarian only for misconduct or neglect of duty, id. at 1340
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 802(i) (2006)), and their rate determinations "are not reversible or
correctable by any other officer or entity within the executive branch," id. The court
therefore invalidated and severed the restrictions on the Librarian's ability to remove the
CRJs to "eliminate[] the Appointments Clause violation," consistent with Free Enterprise
Fund. See id. at 1340-41.
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To be sure, there are a number of hurdles that a constitutional accountability
doctrine presents. The precise details of what must be included in federal contracts
to satisfy an accountability doctrine are not immediately apparent and would have
to be developed through litigation or legislation, which takes time. Moreover, with
further transparency, the public might make demands for insourcing, which could
lead to increases in the number of federal employees exclusively taking on the
more sensitive of government functions. But if outsourcing is to have any
limitations, some lines must be drawn. Under current law, there is no constitutional
doctrine that can feasibly operate to define one. Constitutional accountabilityrooted in the unassailable premise that all power stems from the people who
ultimately oversee its exercise--could provide a way out of a dilemma that
otherwise shows no sign of abating.
CONCLUSION

Constitutional accountability stems from the foundational concept that the
power of government flows from the people through the Constitution. That power
retains its constitutional character even if a federal actor happens to sign a contract
empowering private parties to exercise such power. Accordingly, accountability to
the people is an ineluctable component of any exercise of federal power, regardless
of whether public or private actors are involved. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
reinforced these principles doctrinally, sending a powerful message about the
baseline limits on the outsourcing of federal power. This Article identified some
features of public accountability that are implicit in the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence that might operate to narrow the current gulf that exists between
private parties exercising federal power and the source of such power: the people
themselves. Recognition of a constitutional accountability doctrine would enable
courts, legislators, and the executive branch to proactively design and structure
public-private relationships to conform to constitutional minima where there exist
no established means for systematically managing the entrenched but unbounded
practice of privatizing federal power.
Just as there is no magic bullet for making federal actors accountable to the
populace, there is no single remedy for the accountability problem with
outsourcing. The mechanisms for keeping government workers accountable are
nuanced and complex-a tapestry that is greater than the sum of anyone of its
parts. A constitutional accountability approach to privatization would not
comprehensively solve the problem of unaccountable contractors, but it lays the
groundwork for creating an infrastructure from which a similar network of controls
might arise. If just one seminal case were to reach the Supreme Court, application
of the concepts set forth in Free Enterprise Fund to the privatization context would
prompt outsourcing agencies to begin shaping their behavior around a
constitutional accountability norm. In tum, the culture surrounding privatization
could change, giving rise to more narrow and established rules and practices around
the decision to delegate in the first place. With broader dialogue and analysis, the
normative payoffs that constitutional accountability implicates will only be
revealed further.

